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ABSTRACT

As demands and ambitions increase in Artificial Intelligence, the
need for formal systems that facilitate a study and a simulation of a
machine cognition has become an inevitability.

This paper explores

and developes the foundations of a formal system for propositional
reasoning about knowledge.

The semantics of every meaningful

expression in the system is fully determined by its intension, the set
of complexes in which the expression is confirmed.

The knowledge

system is based on three zeroth-order theories of epistemic reasoning
for consciousness, knowledge and entailed knowledge.

The results

presented in the paper determine the soundness and the completeness of
the knowledge system.

The modes of reasoning and the relations among

the various epistemic notions emphasize the expressive power of the
intensional paradigm.
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1
I. INTRODUCTION

A.

PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY

"All men by nature
desire to know".
Metaphysics, Aristotle

1.

Genesis.

The contemporary echo of the idea of an intelligent

machine originates with the invention of the stored program computer
and the reflections by Alan Turing and Claude Shannon.

The idea is

certainly behind the emergence of Artificial Intelligence as a valid
scientific discourse in the second half of the 20th century.

The possibility that an artifact could perform cognitive
functions, ones exclusively in the domain of human competence, is
intriguing in its implications.

It appears that human nature has been

deprived of the last marvels of existential uniqueness:

the ability

to reason and to create knowledge which are intrinsic components of
int elligence.

Indeed, a respectable number of researchers in Artificial
Intelligence have explicitely equated the cogitative potential of
humans with the one of artifacts.

There are two plausible sources for

the equivalence drawn between artifacts and humans: the first one is
the complexity of artifacts and the second is the rationalist
tradition in the analysis of human cognitive behavior.

Complexity is reflected in the essential attributes of each
artifact, its relative independence, flexibility and multi-usefulness.

All three of the attributes are present both on a structural (or
hardware) level and on a functional (or software) level.

As a direct consequence of complexity one has the effect of
unpredictability.

Regardless of the level of determinism that one

wants to simulate in artifacts, the unpredictability is always
present.

This might be a consequence of the empirical notion that

results of a process are always at least one level higher in their
complexity than the process that has produced them.

Hence, it appears

that unpredictability is unequivocally opposed to the rationalist
tradition in the analysis of human or artificial cogitative
competence.

Intellectual disciplines usually evolve over many centuries.

The

'success' of any intellectual discipline is often measured in how well
the fundamental principles of the discipline have been encapsulated
with in a formal system.

The mathematical method, which in essence

coincides with pure formality and rationality, has been accepted as a
metric of how serious and 'hard' a certain scientific endeavor is.
Rationality requires clearly defined problems, and the problems in AI
defy stable formulations which is a fact often ignored in the analysis
of knowledge.

The rationalist method has also been adopted in the
identification of the phenomenon that creates knowledge, experience
and ratiocination.

The notion of experience is reduced to that of a

modification of a knowledge base (KB).

The initial set of facts

represents an apriori knowledge built into the system which upon the
application of valid inference, becomes an experience for a reasoning
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agent.

Informally, an argument, as a result of inference, is valid if

and only if its premises could not be true and the conclusion false.

Ratiocination is to be understood as a form of analysis entirely
dependent on the inherent power of the ’mind' to reason.

By

identifying the process of reasoning with that of computing, then the
brute force capabilities of the artifact have generally (although not
universally) been accepted as a form of ratiocination.

This characterization of experience and ratiocination is
consistent with the axiomatic acceptance (in Artificial Intelligence)
of the dictum "cognition is a resolute computation".
view this is quite necessary.

From a pragmatic

After all, there will always be

differences between a form and a context and one must recognize that
form is a prerequisite to computation.

By adopting the principles of

mathematical logic, the present work closely follows the rationalist
tradition in Artificial Intelligence.

However, the work differs from the rationalist tradition in the
requirement that the reasoning about knowledge be within the system.
Cognition requires inner presence, or as Heidegger argues
"being-in-the world".

The intention of the epistemic system is to

capture part of the presence in the world by empowering the artifact
with its own mechanism for reasoning about its knowledge.

Thus, it is

important to distinguish between the method which is rationalistic and
the intention which is mentalistic.

The mentalism that has been

induced by the intention, should not be confused with the phenomenon
of anthropomorphic fallacy, the overtones of which are addressed in
the next section.
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2.

The Limits of Formality.

As used throughout the work and

commonly understood, the word formal is synonymous with mechanical.
The seminal works of Godel and Church and the definition of Hilbert's
Programme put to rest the argument of unlimited expressive power of a
formal system [9, 16], hence on mechanization.

The results of Godel and Church are deus ex machina, they
liberate instead of confine.

These results are a vindication in the

resolution of mentalistic problems with formal methods.

It is

reasonable to assume that formality is just the first step due to the
present structural and functional constraints of the artifact and the
incomplete knowledge of ourselves.

To an extent, the source of the problem, an adequate simulation
of of bona fide human cognitive properties, is the nature of the
discipline where Man is the object of and the model for the study or
"a measure of all things” .

The inevitable human interference has

mislead some researchers to look for and recognize purely
anthropomorphic features in artifacts.

For example, the aim of Searle (in Torance [51]) is to
distinguish between weak AI "we can build powerful tools to mimick and
study the mind", and strong AI "something can think in virtue of
instantiating a computer program".

According to Searle, the former

problem is solvable, while the answer to the later is a definitive no.
Others have asserted that on an abstract level the mind and the
computer are the same.

The argument is too strong on the grounds that

there is no a definitive characterization of human cognitive
properties and functions.
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A prima facie value is the symbiotic relationship between AI and
Man, for although we can "still learn more about machines from the
study of man" as Von Neumann put it, there is a lot to be learned
about man from the way some artifacts work also.

An extension is

never a replacement.

These arguments urge us to propose the principle of 'rational
commitment'.

It is simply a recognition of the fact that the question

of intellectual equality between Man and Machine is an exercise in
impuissance.

The rational commitment does not imply commitment to the

rationalist tradition only or exclusion of the mentalism.
earlier, the formalization is based on an abstraction.

As stated

Abstractions

occasionally create deviant images of reality, a fact well-recognized
in the effort to formalize common sense reasoning.

The commitment is

a statement against the reduction of intelligence and its versatility
to a single coordinate.

By necessity the epistemic model starts ad hominem, by desire it
ends ad machinum.

If the necessity and the desire coincide in

extension, the results will be more than gratifying.

Both should be

acknowledged whenever the question is raised of how comprehensive,
compelling, and complete a certain theory is.

3.

Desiderata.

Any serious intent by an artifact to encompass a

level of cognitive generality postulates an integral ability on its
part to reason with deductive, inductive, and evidential rules [12].
The evaluation of evidence is also subject to inductive and deductive
criteria.

A distinction is made in order to stress the meta-system

significance of evidence.

In essence, the rules of evidence govern
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the epistemic environment of an intelligent agent.

They determine the

course of proper reasoning since in extension the true evidence
coincides with knowledge.

The assessment of knowledge within a reasoning system is usually
a result of an internal or an external query.

The nature of the

request might be either to revise the current knowledge of the system
(in view of some new situation) or to answer whether some proposition
is known or not.

It is the later type of response that the epistemic

model is trying to capture.

Inter alia, the solution of reasoning

about what is known may also prove necessary to address the problem of
knowledge revision.

The AI community shares the controversy concerning the
ontological differences between declarative and procedural knowledge
with so many paradigms in epistemology.

Declarative knowledge is

expressible through the mode 'knowing that', while procedural
knowledge through the mode 'knowing how'.

The argument is easily

extended by introducing another mode, often used in the process of
explanation, expressed through 'knowing why'.

The position taken in this research is as follows:

both

procedural and explanatory modes are reducible to a declarative mode.
It is true that explanatory and procedural knowledge do require some
form of causal ordering (an instance of which is the notion of plan),
but I believe that the ordering also can be expressed through a set of
declarations (or propositions).
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Given this point of view, namely, that all modes of knowledge are
reducible to a declarative or propositional mode, propositions are
treated as objects of knowledge and the notion of knowing as an
empirical binary relation between a reasoning agent and an object
(proposition).

However, the argument will be put forward that there

is a more primitive notion of knowledge, the one such as consciousness
which in a sense is a prerequisite for knowing.

Again, consciousness

will be treated as an empirical binary relation between an agent and a
minimal concept expressing proposition.

Thus, it is implicitly

posited that concepts are the ontological constituents of
propos it ions.

Three objectives motivate the present research.
to explore the ontology of knowledge.

The first one is

The second objective is to

develope a zero-order theory for reasoning about concepts.

Finally,

the third objective is to modify the zero-order theory for reasoning
about concepts to a zero-order theory for reasoning about knowledge.

Doxastic and epistemic inclinations such as knowing and believing
are expressed through the verbs of propositional attitudes, know and
believe [50].

Propositional attitudes usually define or appear in an

intensional context.

A context is intensional if its co-referential

expressions such as singular terms, predicates or sentences which have
the same denotation are not substitutable without changing the truth
value of the context as a whole.
extensional.

Otherwise the context is termed as

Since the distinction between extension and intension is

essential in modelling knowledge and belief, a complete section is
devoted to this issue later in the work.
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Although, an occasional reference is made to the doxastic
inclinations such as belief and awareness, this research addresses
mainly their epistemic counterparts, knowledge and consciousness.
However, one can find the metaphysical difference between knowledge
and belief rather interesting in understanding the nature of
knowledge.

Knowledge is a correct interpretation of reality.

Imposing

correctness on the interpretation is to distinguish knowledge from
mere ideas, opinions, perceptions, and beliefs.

To know excludes

being wrong.

As defined, the notion of knowledge is identical with the notion
of truth.

De facto one of these notions would be redundant in the

presence of the other.

The relation between truth and knowledge has a

distinct locus in the cogitative behavior of man.

Knowledge is intrinsically committed to representation and
identification.

The representation deals with the ontological

properties of knowledge.

The identification addresses the

metaphysical properties.

It is commonly understood that "an agent a knows

n"

if and only

if:

(1) The Truth condition is satisfied: n is true
(2) The Belief condition is satisfied: a believes n

The term 'agent* denotes an individual capable of reasoning, while n
stands for an arbitrary proposition.

The first condition is the least
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controversial [4],

It is a matter of intuitive sanction and

linguistic necessity.

Contrasting views exist with respect to the Belief condition.
One view accepts the condition either in a strong form 'knowledge
entails certainty' or in a weak form 'it is not the case that
knowledge entails certainty'.

The other view denies the Belief

condition either in a’weak form 'it is not the case that knowledge
entails not belief* or in a strong form 'knowledge entails not
belief*.

In summary, the study of an epistemic context requires that the
two conditions be satisfied.

On the other hand, in a doxastic context

the Truth condition is neither necessary nor adequate.

4.

Method.

Various paradigms for knowledge representation in

Artificial Intelligence such as semantic networks, frames and units,
reach for mathematical logic whenever a need for justification and
rigor arises.

This is done by transliteration of the object formal

system into a modified system of logic.

It is not surprising that the need for formalization has been
plagued with empirical adventures under the name of heuristic
adequacy.

For example, some have proposed [23] a twelve-valued logic

as a vehicle for studying the progressive growth of plants.

A closer

look into this work reveals a reduction of the twelve-valued to a
two-valued logic.

One might agree with Ryle who posits that formal

logic is a regimentation of the relevant sectors of the ordinary
discourse [18].

However, extreme care should be taken in order not to
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defeat the aim and intent of logic: to discriminate invalid from valid
arguments and to provide rigorous and simple standards for their
expression and evaluation.

The research is based on the seminal work of Richard Montague
[44] in linguistics and philosophy.

The standard of rigor Montague

imposed on the study of properties of natural languages has been that
of mathematical logic.

He recognized that the formal clarity of

set-theoretic semantics or model theory is undoubtedly one of the most
important factors in developing a whole family of logical theories
such as pragmatics, intensional and deterministic systems that would
enable him to explore and formalize the subtleties of natural
language.

The study of language (both formal and natural) is commonly
partitioned into three branches-syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
Syntax is concerned

with relations between linguistic expressions,

while semantics with relations between expressions and the objects to
which they refer.

Pragmatics, on the other hand, is concerned with

relations between expressions, the objects to which they refer, and
the contexts of use of the expressions.

Thus, pragmatics is in a

sense generalization of semantics [44].

The work of Montague on both semantics and pragmatics, with the
exception of the linguistic and philosophical communities, has
received very little attention in Artificial Intelligence and the
cognitive sciences in general.

Recently, Vardi [55] has explored the

intensional approach in a doxastic context using the methodology of
constructive worlds of various depth.
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The reason for this unintended 'ignorance1 is two-fold.

First,

the aforementioned insistence of Montague on mathematical rigor has
been, at least in the opinion of this author, misunderstood to be
irreconcilable with the mentalistic school in cognitive sciences.
Again, the misconception is a result of not distinguishing between
intentions and methods.

Otherwise, Montague would not have introduced

the notions of possible worlds and contexts of use if he had thought
that classical semantics was sufficient to deal with problems of
natural languages.

Secondly, due to his untimely death, many

prophetic articles written by Montague were left in a cryptographic
form which certainly causes difficulties in identifying possible areas
of application.

The initial work in developing an axiomatic theory of the logic
of intensions was done by Church [10].

To provide an interpretation,

Carnap [7] introduced the idea of state of affairs, a sort of
plausible qualifier for the intension of an expression.

He posited

that in essence the extension is a function of two arguments, the
expression and the state of affairs.

The semantic considerations for

the intensional logic were elaborated by Kaplan in his dissertation,
where the possible state of affairs were models of the corresponding
language [25].

A general axiomatized system for the Montague type of

intensional theory was developed by Gallen [15].

The zero-order epistemic system proposed in this research should
be classified as a generalized extension of ordinary propositional
calculus to accommodate reasoning about knowledge.
extension is to be understood as follows:

The nature of the

the basic system and the

extended system share the same vocabulary, and have the same theorems
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and rules of inference a propo the shared vocabulary.

The extension

is done in ©rcter to enrich the expressive power of the underlying
system via some extended vocabulary, additional axioms and rules of
inference.

It is implicit that the arguments are subject to the criteria of
rationality, material adequateness, and intuitive admissability.

In

the absence of consensus with respect to the standards for inclusion
of an arbitrary formal system to the family of logics, the question
would be ignored because it leads to a metaphysical circus [23].

The use of a 'logical system' follows from the intention to put
forward an explanatory model for understanding the use of epistemic
notions in an ordinary discourse and within the framework of
intensional logic.

Clearly, the laws of logic and the laws of thought

are not isomorphic [19].

The former are considered to be an

expression of ability rather than obligation.

Thus, given an intellect and sufficient time (effort), logical
and material information, inferences could be made about some state of
affairs.

In essence that is the parthenogenetic nature of logic or

the potential to induce new knowledge in an environment where the
information content is restricted to the initial one.

Hence, the

intuitive understanding of logic that we have is probably best
expressed by Witgenstain who wrote " ... logic is not a theory of the
world, but its reflection".

It is again a question of pragmatics.
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B.

PRINCIPIA FUNDAMENTA

"if modern modal logic was conceived
in sin, then it has been redeemed
through Godliness."
The Unprovability of Consistency,
Boolos

1.

Propositional Calculus.

By a propositional language P is

understood a language of which the symbols are drawn from the
following categories:

(1)

Improper symbols
1.1. Logical constants
(a) -«

read ’it is not the case that'

(b) &

read 'and'

(c) v

read 'or'

(d) ->

read 'if .

(e) <->

read ’if and only if'

.. then'

1.2. Parenthesis, brackets, and commas;
(2)

Proper symbols
A denumerable set of propositional variables:
{p> q» r> s , . . . }.

Both, the improper and proper symbols denote the set of primitive
symbols of P.

A formula is a finite sequence of symbols.

If f and g

are formulas, then the concatenation of f and g, denoted by fg, is a
formula of P.

It is important to distinguish between the language P, or for
that matter for any language which is the object of study , and the
English language extended with mathematical vocabulary and symbols in
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which the discussion about P takes place.

The language one studies is

called the object language, and the extended English is called
meta-language.

The theorems about the propositional system are proved

in both the object language and the meta-language.

One of the objectives of a formal language is to be able to
generate in a unique and precise manner the set of "meaningful
expressions" which belong to the language.

The set of meaningful

expressions of P is actually the set of the well-formed formulas of P.
They are inductively defined by the following set of formation rules:

(Rl) A propositional variable standing alone is a wff.
(R2) If f is a wff, then ->f is a wff.
(R3) If f and g are wffs, then [f & g] is a wff.

The set of wffs of P is the intersection of all sets F of
formulas such that:

(1) p e F for each propositional variable p.
(2) For each formula f, if f e F, then -*f e F.
(3) For all formulas f and g, such that f e F and g e F.
then [f & g] e F.

The axiom system of P consists of all wffs which have the
following forms:

(AI) -[f v f] v f
(A2) -*f v • g v f
(A3)

v g] v • ->[h v f] v • g v h
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The number of axioms of P is infinite.

Any further reference to

the axioms of P, (AI) through (A3), will be in the form of "all
propositional tautologies".

There is only one rule of inference in P

which is:

(MP) From f and f -> g, to infer g.

Let H denote a set of wffs of P.

A proof of wff f from the set H

of hypothesis is a finite sequence f-^ , . . ., fm of wffs such that fm
is f and for each i (1 < i < m) at least one of the following
conditions is satisfied:

(Cl) fj^ is an axiom.
(C2) f^ is a member of H.
(C3) f-y is inferred by (MP) from wffs fj and fj^ where j < i,
and k < i.

Any logical system that contains the axioms of P will be termed
as a standard logical system.

A proof of wff f in P is a proof of f

from the empty set of hypothesis.
only if f has a proof in P.

A wff f is a theorem of P if and

Given set H of hypothesis, the

derivability of a wff f from H is denoted by H |- f.
wff f is a theorem of P one writes f- f.

To indicate that

The decision problem for a

logical systems is the problem of finding an effective procedure for
determining of any wff f whether or not f is a theorem of the logical
system.

So far all the logical notions that were introduced for P, are
essentially syntactic.

In order to appreciate and understand the full

expressive power of a logical system, one also needs semantics.

For
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example, the solution for the decision problem for P, might be rather
difficult in syntactic terms.

Hence, the definition of salient

logical and metalogical attributes such as consistency,
satisfiability, validity, soundness, and completeness which apply to
logical systems is necessary.

An assignment of truth values to propositional variables is a
function from the set of variables to the set {F, T} or {0, 1} of
truth values where F (0) and T(l) denote Falsehood and Truth
respectively.

Following the notation that was introduced by Von

Neumann, 2 stands for the set of truth values {0, 1}.

The value V(f)

of wff f with respect to the assignment A, is defined by induction on
the complexity of f in P.
1 for all assignments A,
|= f.

A wff f is tautology if and only if V(f) =
When a wff f is tautology it is denoted by

A wff f is contradiction if and only if V(f) = 0

for all

assignments A.

A wff f is valid with respect to interpretation if and only if
V(f) = 1 for all assignments of values to its variables.
validity of wff f is denoted by ]= f.

Again, the

An interpretation of a logical

system is sound if and only if all the axioms are valid and the rules
of inference preserve validity.

A logical system is consistent with respect to negation if and
only if there is no wff f such that (- f and |- -*f are in the system.
logical system is complete if every tautology is a theorem.

When a

logical system is both sound and complete then one may say that the
logical system is determined.

The logical system of propositional

calculus P is consistent and determined.

For proofs of these results

A
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the reader is referred to Mendelson [42].

The account of the

propositional system presented here is based on the exceptional text
by Andrews "An Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Type Theory: The
Truth through Proof" [1].

The modal systems that follow are extensions of classical
propositional calculus.

The logical and meta-logical notions

described here are applicable to modal systems too,

However, some

modifications are necessary to accommodate the 'interpretations' of
modal operators.

2.

Systems of Modal Logic.

A formal system conceived to study

the nature of logical necessity, impossibility, and contingency is
known as modal logic.

The distinction between a necessity and a

contingency is a metaphysical one and is not to be confused with the
epistemic difference between a priori and a posteriori truths.

The

question whether these notions coincide in extension is still an open
one.

The difference between necessary and contingent truths is
sometimes taken to be analogous to the difference between 'analytic'
and 'synthetic' truths.

An analytic truth is defined as 'true solely

in virtue of its meaning' and a synthetic truth as 'true in virtue of
facts' .

Given a proposition IT, another proposition can be formed
asserting that n is necessary, with the expression "it is necessary
that

n".

The new proposition will be true when

false when fl is not necessary.

FI is

necessary, and

In this case, 'it is necessary that'
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is a monadic proposition forming operator (or a sentenial operator) on
propositions.

The operator used to form the new proposition is not a
truth-functional one; given that p is false it follows that p is not
necessary, while if p is true it certainly does not follow that p is
necessary.

Operators not subject to truth-functional interpretation

are termed modal; hence the attribute modal to the systems of logic
that use them.

Another monadic sentenial operator, expressible in the

form 'it is possible that' represents the possibility operator.

In

view of the many different notations in modal logic, L shall be used
for the operator of necessity and M for the operator of possibility.
The next step is to present the basic modal systems.

The well formed formulas of a modal system are built out of
atomic formulas in the same manner as they were built in the system P
of propositional calculus.

Also, if f is a wff so are Lf and Mf.

weakest system of modal logic K has the following axiom schemes and
rules of inference:

(AO) Truth-functional tautologies
(AI) L(f -> g) -> Lf -> Lg
(MP) From f, f -> g infer g
(NC) From Lf infer f

If we add the axiom scheme:

(A2) Lf -> f

The
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we get the system T.

The Brouwershe system is obtained with the

addition of:

(A3) f -> LMf

and the system S4 with the addition of (A4) to the system T:

(A4) Lf -> LLf

Finally, S5 is obtained from T with the addition of:

(A5) Mf -> LMf

Systems that include all the theorems of K and are closed under rules
of inference (MP) and (NC) are called normal.

Kripke's seminal work in providing semantics for the inclinations
of modality [27, 28, -30] is closely followed in representing the
interpretation for modal logic.

A Kripke structure is an ordered

triple <W, WO, R>, where W is the set of possible worlds; WO is an
element of W and stands for the actual or 'real1 world; and R is a
reflexive relation on W, named a relation of accessibility.

Given two

arbitrary worlds W1 and W2, W1 R W2 means that every proposition true
in W 2 is possible in the world Wl.

If additional requirements are

imposed on the relation R, such as transitivity or symmetry the
different modal systems are obtained as before.

Assume we have a Kripke structure <W, WO, R>, which will be
denoted with KS.

A model V on KS is a binary function V(P, G), where

P varies over the set of atomic formulae and G over the set of
possible worlds W.

The range of V is naturally the set 2.

The

assignment of the truth-values to the non-atomic formulae is done by
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induction.

For example, if V(f, G) = 1 and V(g, G) = 1 and assuming

V(f, G) and V(g, G) are already defined for all G e W, one can define
V(f & g, G) = 1; otherwise V(f & g, G) = 0.

The definition of V(Lf, G) is interesting.

Let V(Lf, G) = 1 for

every- G' e W such that GRG' holds, otherwise let V(f, G) = 0.

Then f

is necessary in G if and only if f is true in all worlds G' which are
possible relative to G.

The completeness theorem, first proved by

Kripke [30], equates the syntactical notion of provability in modal
logic with the semantical notion of validity.

The standard language of predicate calculus, given in Andrews
[1], can be augmented in the same manner as the propositional calculus
was.

With the addition of the monadic operator L and the appropriate

modal interpretation the modal predicate calculus is obtained.

There

are many more fundamental (and possibly open) problems concerning the
modal predicate system than the propositional system.

The objections put forward by Quine concerning modal logic are:
there is neither a clear reason nor motivation for formalization, and
the interpretation presents insuperable difficulties [23].

For

scientific and mathematical reasoning, argues Quine, there is no need
to extend classical logic.

The argument is short sighted.

A

sufficiency for mathematical and scientific discourse might not be
appropriate for ethical, legal, or for that matter a common sense
context.

The denial of any formalization is equal to the assertion

that these concepts are empty which is at least a disputable argument.
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The introduction of quantification to modality for Quine is a
nightmare.

This is due to his criteria of:

(1) ontological

commitment-a test of what kinds of things a theory says there are; (2)
ontological admissability- admit only those entities for which there
is an adequate criteria of identity.
ontological commitment.
talk about things.

The quantifiers carry the

They are the device by means of which people

Modalities do not, in contrast, directly talk

about things; they express the ways of talking about things [22, 23].

Different problems arise from the behavior of singular terms
appearing in the scope of modal operators.

Modal operators are

referentially opaque or intensional and the substitution (or the law
of Leibnitz) fails in modal context.

This means that in the scope of

a modal operator, substitution of one singular term for another one
with the denotation of the same object can change the truth value of
the sentence.

The failure of the Leibnitz's law is regarded by some

to be conditio sine qua non that a satisfactory interpretation of
identity exists in modal systems.

Take for example (Quine in Linsky

[38]):

(1) 9 = the number of planets

which is certainly a true utterance.
(1) into the sentence

(2) L (9 > 7)

then he gets a false sentence

If one substitutes the identity
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(3) L (the number of planets > 7 )

The replies to Quine's criticism have been numerous and vivid.
For the curious reader, Linsky [38] contains an exceptional collection
of articles and Haack [23] is a scholarly account of all the
difficulties the area bristles with.

Another problem is that of transworld identity:

which

individuals in different possible worlds are to count as the same.

So

far, the most appealing solution has been proposed by Kripke [29],
where a proper name is is equated with a rigid designator which
denotes the same individual in all possible worlds.

The formal semantics, based on the possible worlds approach
developed by Hintikka [18] and Kripke [27], dispersed some of Quine's
criticism and to an extent settled the question of the
interpretability of modal systems.

Currently, there are three different approaches concerning the
nature of the possible worlds.

Kripke's approach is a conceptualist

one, for him possible worlds are the ways people express their
conception of the world to be different.

The linguistic approach, due

principally to Hintikka [18], identifies the possible worlds with a
maximally consistent sets of sentences.

Finally, Lewis takes the view

that possible worlds are abstract entities independent of a language
or a thought [23].

The intent of the section was to give an overview of the
important problems raised by the development of modal logic.

A

confinement to issues relevant to the epistemic concepts has closely
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been observed.

In all fairness to Quine, it must be stated that he

never did question the mathematical soundness of the modal system.
Another sign of vindication, at least with respect to knowledge and
belief, comes again from Quine who as quoted by Linsky in [38] says:

"What makes me take the propositional attitudes more
seriously than logical modality is a different reason:
not that they are clearer, but they are less clearly
dispensible. We cannot easily forswear daily
reference to belief, pending some substitute idiom
as yet unforeseen. We can much more easily do
without reference to necessity."

3.

The Classic Theory of Knowledge.

The formal conception of a

system for logical assessment of knowledge dates back to the efforts
of Von Wright in his 1951 work "An Essay on Modal Logic".

The ideas

developed by Von Wright in passim motivated Hintikka's work on
epistemic logic, which resulted in the lengthy treatment of the
subject [19].

Before proceeding with a detailed account of the theory

developed by Hintikka, which is referred to as 'the classical theory
of knowledge', the reader should bear in mind that 'the theory' is
based on modal logic.

Hintikka's intention was to formalize the basic epistemic
inclinations such as "a knows that", "a believes that", "it is
possible for all that a knows", and "it is compatible with everything
a knows that".

The four epistemic inclinations are referred to by

four monadic operators,

'K', 'B', 'P',and 'c' respectively.

free individual symbol denoting an agent.

'a' is a

Since our interest is

focused on knowledge, only the axiom system and rules of inference
relative to it are presented:
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(AI) All propositional tautologies
(A2) Kaf & Ka(f -> g) -> Kag
(A3) Kaf -> f
(A4) Kaf -> KaKaf
(A5)-Kaf -> Ka-’Kaf
(MP) From f and f -> g, infer g
(NC) From f infer Kaf

where f, and g are well-formed formulas, and the formula 'Kaf' is the
formal counterpart of 'the agent a knows that f '.

The axiom (A5) was rejected by Hintikka as unintuitive.

The

axiom system, excluding (A5), is determined since the system is
isomorphic to the modal system S4.

When A5 is included, the system is

determined again whence the system is isomorphic to the modal system
S5.

The first axiom and the rule of inference (MP) are credit from
the propositional calculus.

A source of controversy and critique in

the AI community are the second axiom and the necessitation rule of
inference.
knower'.

It appears that they define the agent as a 'perfect
Its knowledge is closed under implication and everything

true, by necessitation, is known to the agent 'a' .

The axiom in question is of a particular interest.

It expresses

the notion that whenever someone knows anything, he knows all its
logical consequences.

The phenomenon has appeared under different

names in the literature on epistemology such as the consequential
closure, the conservation law, and the paradox of logical omniscience.
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The acceptance of this axiom, it has been argued, eliminates the
need for search and is not admissable in a resource-bounded
environment.

The axiom is considered to be a sufficient reason to

reject any model-theoretic analysis of epistemic inclinations.

Hintikka in [20] suggests two directions in resolving the paradox
of omniscience, that is, to delineate the set of logical consequences
for which the paradox will hold.

The first avenue is to put a

syntactical restriction on the deductive argument that leads from f to
g.

The idea is that the number of free individual symbols and the

number of layers of quantifiers determines the number of individuals
in a sentence.

Hence, the parameter of an argument from f to g should

never be larger than the respective parameters in f and g.

The other

avenue is a probabilistic one and reflects the urn theory.

The nested

quantifiers can be thought of as successive draws of individuals from
an urn.

The later interpretation may have only one disadvantage:

a

draw is too much like a search attempt.

An interesting

approach has been proposed by several authors

such as Cresswell [11], Kripke [31], and Hintikka [21].

The paradigm

goes under different names such as non-standard worlds, impossible
worlds, and non-normal worlds, but the respective notions are similar.
Thus, in these 'unworldly' worlds not all valid formulas need to be
true and inconsistent formulas may be true.

However, as it is shown

later while reviewing the work of Levesque [36] who calls these
non-standard worlds "incoherent situations", an agent still has an
opportunity for a perfect knowledge.

The mode of reasoning has only

been changed, but a strong intuitive sanction is lacking.
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A3 is the axiom of veridicality; it states that an agent knows
only those things that are true.

The grounds for its inclusion were

already explained in the discussion of the nature of knowledge.

In a

doxastic context this axiom is not valid.

The last two of the axioms are known as axioms of introspection.
A4 is the axiom of positive introspection, if an agent knows something
then he knows that he knows it.

A5 is the axiom of negative

introspection, if an agent does not know something then he knows that
he does not know.

Both axioms involve meta-level inference about

knowledge, or what is commonly termed as iteration of knowledge.

The

theoretical ground for their inclusion or exclusion are still not
settled, but both axioms are proven to be useful in a multiagent
environment and distributed environment.

Hintikka's idea of consistency, in his own words, "is immunity to
certain kinds of criticism".

Instead of speaking about consistency

and inconsistency, he defines respectively the counterterms
defensibility and indefensibility.

A valid set of sentences is termed

as a set of self-sustaining sentences.

Originally, Hintikka [19] formulated his semantics in terms of
sets of sentences called model sets.

When Kripke [27] introduced the

possible world as a primitive in the context of modal logic, his
theory supplanted all earlier theories of states of affairs or sets of
sentences as models.

As a consequence, Hintikka [18] reformulated his

semantics in terms of possible worlds.

Thus, a sentence is self-

sustaining if it is true in all possible worlds, and defensible if it
is true in one such world.
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Hintikka's answer to the questions raised by Quine is the concept
of multiple referentiality.

It simply states the fact that identities

hold in some possible world but not in others is due to the reference
of the singular terms to the objects in different ways in different
possible worlds.

Provided that this is true, a combination of

quantifiers and epistemic operators should not cause difficulties as
long as it is done for individuals which exist in a particular world.

The quantification across epistemic operators presents another
problem.

The position of Hintikka on the issue is to be prohibitive:

the principle of substitution is not to be applied unless additional
premises are introduced.

It is possible that the restriction deviates

from the intended generality of the principle, however, additional
premises are quite intuitive in epistemological context.

The persistence Professor Hintikka exhibited in his work on the
foundations of logic of knowledge has prevented the reduction of the
theory to an intellectual accident.

His efforts have been rewarded by

the proliferation of research in computer science, theory of games,
economics, communications, cryptography, and Artificial Intelligence.
It is to the last that we focus our attention.
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C.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

"An expert is one who does not
have to think. He knows."
F. L. Wright

1.

The Initial Stage.

The renewed interest in a general machine

intelligence was sparked by an article co-authored jointly by McCarthy
and Hayes [39] in 1969.

In the paper they examine the problem of

creating a program capable of inferring in a formal language a
strategy that achieves a predetermined goal.

According to McCarthy

and Hayes, the task requires formalization of the following concepts:
causality, ability, and knowledge.

With this in mind they proceed by

specifying an intelligent artifact, termed Reasoning Program.

The artifact has external and internal levels of communication
and various sorts of representation for pictures, scenes, situations,
and inference.

The program involves both heuristic and

epistemological structures.

Once the knowledge is adequate, the

system should be able to find a strategy and prove it is correct.

The

authors are only interested in the epistemic aspect of the Reasoning
Program.

Incidentally, the program that deals with the epistemic

aspect is called the Missouri Program.

McCarthy and Hayes attempted to define criteria for an adequate
representation of the world.

Accordingly, they are: metaphysical-the

form of representation does not contradict the facts of reality it
intends to represent; heuristic-the reasoning process is expressible
in the representation; epistemological-it can be used to express the
facts as they really are.

In addition, the article presents the
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thoughts behind possible formalizations of situations, actions, and
strategies.

Their first-order situation calculus, extended later by

McCarthy [41] has had an extraordinary influence.

Recently, an

analogous formalism termed mental calculus has also been elaborated by
McCarthy [40].

The primary concern of McCarthy is to specify the necessary
knowledge conditions.

If these conditions are met, the reasoning

program is able to execute.a plan correctly.

The research advocates

explicit reasoning on the part of an agent concerning his ability to
carry out actions.

This amounts to writing down all the necessary

conditions and verifying their truth-value prior to undertaking any
action.

The disadvantages to the proposed method are: the possibility of
knowledge explosion due to a large number of proper axioms needed to
describe each individual action, and consequently the proof procedures
tend to be extremely long.

The theory developed by Hayes and McCarthy adheres to one of the
two predominant schools of thought relative to a formal treatment of
knowledge, the so-called sentenial or syntactic paradigm where the
knowledge is a relation between an agent and a sentence.

In the other

school, known as the semantic paradigm, knowledge is a relation
between an agent and a proposition.

The merits of both schools are

the subject of examination in the next pages.
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2.

The Semantic Paradigm.

The intuitive appeal of propositional

approach springs from the possible world semantics which has an
elegant mathematical formulation and is subject to logical analysis.

The intention of Moore [43] is to explain the relation between
knowledge and action.

In his system, an agent who knows the

combination of a safe should be able to reason and conclude that he
also knows how to open the safe.

The system is motivated by the

theory of Hintikka and is isomorphic to the modal system S4.

The

standard tense logic [48] along with the situation calculus by
McCarthy [40] are interpreted with possible world semantics to
accommodate reasoning about actions.

The paradox of logical omniscience is briefly examined and made
unquestionable on the grounds of a two-fold analogy:

the general

default rule which states that something is to be assumed true unless
otherwise stated, and the frictionless case in physics.

To analyze statements of the form KNOW (a, II) read as "an agent a
knows that n", Moore defines a relation of compatibility denoted by K.
Now, K(a, Wl, W2) means that the possible world W2 is compatible with
what A knows in a possible world Wl, i. e., as far as 'a* is concerned
he might just as well be in W2.

The relation of compatibility is

essentially a reinterpretation of the accessibility relation as
defined by Kripke [27].

With respect to actions, an agent 'a' knows how to perform an
action if it knows the arguments of the action.

In this case, an

executable description of an action is to count as its rigid
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designator, as it is a computer program an executable description of a
computation to an interpreter.

For Levesque [36, 37], both the paradox of logical omniscience
and the syntactic paradigm are not admissable.

The former denies

reality, while the later leads to semantic horrors.

His solution is

to delineate the class of all beliefs into two subclasses, a class of
implicit beliefs and a class of explicit beliefs.

The class of

explicit beliefs is properly included in the class of implicit beliefs
for which the omniscience holds.

Thus, an agent is still a perfect

knower when it reasons about his implicit beliefs.

Each possible world is a situation, where a given proposition p
might be: undefined, false, true, or both true and false making a
situation inconsistent.

Although, Levesque denies using a

non-standard world semantics calling his impossible worlds incoherent
situations, the result is the same as in the models of Cresswell [11]
and Hintikka [21].

What is different is that his agents reason in

relevance logic based on the four-valued system proposed by Belnap.

An encouraging result is that, at least for a propositional case,
it is easier to calculate what is believed than what is implied by the
belief.

Thus, given a knowledge base (a set of sentences) KB and a

sentence p in a conjuctive normal form, to determine if KB logically
implies p is NP-complete.

However, to determine if KB entails p has

0(mn) algorithm, where m =|KB| and n =|p|.

Some recent work has been

done in supplementing full semantics for the believe system of
Levesque that has a decidable segment.
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3.

The Syntactic Paradigm.

Quine and Carnap have recommended

that modalities such as 'necessary', 'possible', and similarly 'know'
and 'believe', could be treated as predicates of expressions rather
than propositional operators [44].

For instance, the sentence "it is

necessary that the ice is cold" is to be replaced by the sentence
'"The ice is cold’is necessary".

Notice that the operator of modality

is not being prefixed to a sentence, but to a name of a sentence.

The

advantages are the elimination of nonextensional context and the
possibility for an application of predicate calculus with identity.

A

few researchers in AI have found these advantages attractive enough to
develop first-order syntactical theories of belief and knowledge.

An

account of the most prominent ones follows.

A first-order formalism for multi-agent planning environment is
the locus of the Konolige's interest [33],
syntactic counterpart of Moore's theory.

It is essentially the
The work gives a careful

axiomatization of the language levels and the nesting of beliefs.
proof method is a complex deduction process

The

based on the semantic

attachment technique originated by Weyhrauch in 1980 [56].

The

reasoning process performed by an agent is modelled as an inference
procedure in the object language.

Essentially, Konolige simulates the

behavior of agents performing cooperative tasks that require that each
agent know the future states of its knowledge and the plans and
actions of other agents.

The deduction model of belief, yet another theory of Konolige
[34], is an attempt to address the question of logical omniscience in
a more sophisticated manner.

An agent, provided with a sound logic,

is placed in a resource bounded environment.

It is a
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symbol-processing system where beliefs are represented in some
internal mental language.

An agent reasons about his beliefs by

manipulating these syntactic objects.

Since the process of inference is recognized as being
resource-dependent, the derivation of all the consequences of beliefs
is logically incomplete.

The semantics for the system has an

'outside* role, i. e., the semantics is needed by an external observer
to analyze the beliefs of an agent.

A common problem with the syntactic approach is its impure
relation with semantics.

For example, any two sets of sentences are

to be accepted as distinct semantic entities, such as (f v g) and (g v
f) which are for the agent different belief sets.

Konolige 'solves'

this problem by imposing a deduction rule which demands the presence
of both sentences in the base set of beliefs.

It is easy to notice

the ad hoc character of the syntactic approach; a collection of
sometimes hardly intelligible rules which are to replace at least part
of the semantics.

The syntactic theory of belief and 'action, as examined by Haas
[17], treats beliefs as sentences in a first order logic.

The

application of quotation marks, Quine [46], is done to individual
terras rather than whole expressions.

The method of proof is based on

the so-called Reflection Schema which is an infinite set of axioms.
Preference is given to Kripke's theory of truth as a method to deal
with paradoxes.

Consequently, most of the sentences are expected to

be grounded which means that the determination of their truth value is
reached without resorting to an infinite recursion [32].
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A robust theory of knowledge, communication, action, and
planning, is behind yet another attempt in syntactics by Morgenstern
[45].

As usual, the theory starts with the definition of a syntactic

predicate 'know* that ranges over names of sentences.

Thus the model

remains a first order theory inspite of the quantification over
sentences.

The theory of truth by Kripke is again embraced to deal

with paradoxes.

The axiom system is similar to the one formulated by Moore, a
fortiori Hintikka.

In the first axiom the system of propositional

calculus is replaced by the system of predicate calculus.
does not know all the axioms in the system.

An agent

It knows only the axioms

of predicate logic and the axioms that constitute the system of
knowledge.

Most of the major objections to the syntactic paradigm came from
Montague [44].

He proved with reference to the "Knower Paradox" the

following result: if 'KNOW' is a syntactic predicate, one can
construct a sentence 4>,

such that 4> if and only if KNOW(a, " -><£").

Assuming logical omniscience, veridicality, and necessitation hold, 4>
is inconsistent.

A recent article by Riviers and Levesque [37] vindicates to an
extent the syntactic theory by showing that any modal logic can be
translated to a first-order logic with a predicate ranging over
sentences.

The authors assert that any intensional operator governed

by a reasonable modal theory, i. e., a theory containing all extended
theorems and closed under modus ponens, could be treated
syntactically.

Unfortunately, some of their claims appear to be
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obscure (at least to this author) which might be an indication that an
additional work is needed concerning the problem of which paradigm,
the syntactic or semantic, is more powerful and adequate.

4.

The Hybrid Revision.

Building on the work of Levesque [36],

Faigin and Vardi [13], and Halpern and Moses [24] developed a logic of
general awareness with the intention of preserving the elegance of
possible world semantics while resolving the paradox of omniscience.
An agent might implicitly have all the logical consequences of his
beliefs, but the explicit beliefs are the ones he has and acts upon.

At each possible world a syntactic filter (or an awareness
operator) is introduced to delineate the explicit from implicit
beliefs.

Thus the theory has now three unary modal operators: B

(explicit belief), L (implicit belief, and A (awareness).

In their

model, an explicit belief is semantically defined as implicit belief
restricted to the sentences permitted by the awareness.

If an agent

is aware of all the sentences in the system, then the classes of
explicit and implicit beliefs are identical.

The model enables

reasoning in a resource-bounded environment, although its complexity
is increased.

However, it might be necessary to induce small

constraints into the semantics in order to treat modalities in a more
efficient way.

In the overview, the focus was on general systems rather than on
specific applications.

The intention was to emphasize the relevance

of the research to the issues of computational reasoning and knowledge
representation. Hence, a few areas of application are briefly
enumerated.
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It appears that it is almost impossible to delineate the
boundaries of the research areas which are not influenced by reasoning
about knowledge.

To attempt a definition may prove to be imprudent

and counterproductive.

After all, no science has benefited more from

confluence of ideas than AI.
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II. THE SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE

A.

THE ONTOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

"The totality of meaning is
never fully rendered . . . "
Merleau-Ponty

1.

Extension and Intension.

Since the publication of Frege's

work [14], the functionality principle according to which the meaning
of an expression is a function of the meanings of its constituents has
generally been accepted in linguistics.

However, due to the

ambiguities present in the context of natural languages Frege
recognized the need for a distinction between an extension or
denotation of an expression 4> in some language L and its intension or
sense.

To reduce the number of possible constituents let us use the

term 'entity' to represent things, items, objects or individuals.

The

few examples below illustrate why the distinction between an intension
and an extension is necessary.

For instance, take a particular word such as 'book'.

The

intension of 'book' is a definition, such as "a lengthy treatment of a
subject, printed and binded, and comes on the market as a commodity".
The extension of 'book' is the set of all books in the world.
Simpliciter, if the word 'book' denotes a concept of a book then the
intension is all entities that define the concept, while the extension
is all those entities that 'fall' under the concept.
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Certain authors consider the distinction between an intension and
extension in the semantics of natural languages to be analogous with
the distinction between an episodic and a semantic memory [52].

The

episodic memory holds particular facts which correspond to extensions,
while the semantic memory holds general principles which are
intensions.

For Umberto Eco, the intension of an expression

corresponds to the theory of signification and the extension of an
expression corresponds to the theory of communication.
interpretation is the traditional one.

Our

The intension of an expression

is a function over the set of possible worlds.

Assume an arbitrary language L and given an expression <t> in L,
denote the extension of 4> with EXT (<f>) and its intension with INT (<t>).
When the expression 4> is a sentence, then the EXT (4>) is the set 2.

Does the definition of extension of the expressions presented
above help in any way to extract the meaning that each expression
carries within itself?
four" and

Consider the sentences 4> = "Two plus two are

"John and Ann are step-siblings".

functionality is satisfied.

The principle of

If both sentences are true (or false)

then the sentences have the same extension.

But 4> and \jr have entirely

different meanings and thus represent different informational sources
for a reasoning agent.

The distinction between an extension and an intension is even
more apparent in the examples where the principle of functionality
fails, such as oblique or intensional contexts.
the ’morning star-evening star' paradox.

The famous example is

Recalling the previous

exposition on modalities, the sentence "Necessarily the morning star
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is identical with the morning star" is true with respect to all
possible worlds.

So, if one is to follow the functionality principle

and replace the second occurrence of 'morning star' with 'evening
star' the resulting sentence "Necessarily the morning star is equal to
the evening star" is true.
false.

Why?

On the contrary, the second sentence is

It is quite possible that there is a world in which the

stars are not identical, although both constituents "morning star" and
"evening star" have the same extension.

The 'morning star-evening star' paradox could also be examined in
an epistemic context.

The following sentence "if the Morning Star =

the Evening Star, then Ann knows that the Morning Star appears in the
morning if and only if Ann knows that the Evening Star appears in the
morning" is not generally considered to be a logical truth.

By

logical truth of a sentence 4> in a language L one understands that 4>
is true under all possible interpretations of L.

But this is

consistent with our understanding of epistemic notions.

In order for

4> to be a logical truth, <j> should have an additional premise "Ann

knows that the Morning Star = the Evening Star".

Indeed, the

additional premise can be regarded as a deviation from the standard
logic.

But the deviation is acceptable as long as one tries to

capture different epistemic and doxastic inclinations.

These

propositional inclinations are entirely different enterprise.

One possible solution to the problem is to avoid possible world
semantics and modalities.

It is simple enough and wrong.

Assume that

Mr. Spock was a student in the Computer Science Department at UMR.
While pursuing his degree he supported himself by working at nights in
the library, where one his coworkers used to be Mrs.

Robinson.

After
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graduation, Mr. Spock is hired by Bell Labs.

Since Mr. Spock

currently works for Bell Labs, the expression "coworker of Spock" is
coextensive with the expression "member of Bell Labs".

Now consider

the expression "former coworker of Mr. Spock" which is coextensive
with Mrs. Robinson.

Replacing the expression "coworker of Mr. Spock "

with a "member of Bell Labs" yields the expression "former member of
Bell Labs" which is not coextensive with Mrs. Robinson.
has failed again without mentioning any possible worlds.

The principle
Tense

modalities are vivid examples for demonstrating an intensional context
[15].

Clearly, the extension of an expression must somehow depend on
the syntactical context in which it occurs.

An expression <f> used in

an ordinary context has an extension EXT {<*>) while used in a
referentially oblique context its extension becomes INT (<£).

To

preserve the principle of functionality one might introduce for each
expression <f> a new one denoted by 4>' or the concept of <f>, such that the
extension of <j>’ is the intension of <p.

As a consequence the

decomposition of any expression could be done in terms of both
extensions and intensions [15], which depends on the nature of context
in which each individual construct appears.

None of the terms concerning the context of the use of an
expression in some language L, such as possible state of affairs,
possible worlds, points of reference or 'indexes* satisfies our
intuition.

The idea of worlds at least with respect to reasoning by

artifacts is too ambitious.

As Hintikka quotes Savage's suggestion in

[20], it is better to think in terms of some 'small worlds'.
Extensive world theories are implausible creations at the current
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level of AI.

The term 'points of reference' is more appropriate in

reasoning when tense modalities are involved.

Hence, a new term

'complex' is introduced which supplants all aforementioned terms with
a similar meaning.

Complex is simply a set of propositions which are cognitively
accessible to a reasoning agent and sets of complexes which stand for
those propositions.
be denoted by K.

The non-empty denumerable set of complexes shall

Thus, given a sentence <f> its intension, INT (</>) is

exactly the proposition expressed by the sentence </>.
regard the object of knowledge to be a proposition.

The idea is to
Hence, knowledge

is an empirical relation between an entity (reasoning agent) and a
proposition.

The important role that propositions and Concepts play

in an intensional context is addressed in the next sections.

Is there a need for the notion of complexes in the treatment of
knowledge?

Assume that there are two physically identical complexes,

yet what different agents know with respect to those complexes is not
necessarily identical.
conceptualist one.

The position taken in the research is a

Complexes are not only necessary as primitives for

analysis of epistemic and doxastic notions, but they are indispensible
if one is to capture what is vacuously called a multitude of
conceptions or imagination.

Both complexes and intensions are

possibly the initial steps toward a comprehensive theory of meaning
and understanding.

The next question is concerned with the relation of the logic of
intensions and the theory of knowledge.

The logic of intensions

comprehends modal logic, whence knowledge is a modality.

Both, the
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intensional and higher order modal logic are alternative formulations
to each other.

Moreover, the monadic modalities coincide with the

properties of propositions.

2.

Knowledge-carriers.

The condition imposed on the

propositions that constitute the epistemic environment of an agent was
that they be true.

The question is whether propositions are the

entities capable of truth or falsity, and in general what kind of
entities are likely candidates to be 'truth-bearers'?

The choice is

limited to sentences and propositions.

Sentences are examined first.

A sentence is any complete and

correct string of expressions in a given language according to its
grammatical rules.

For example, "The sun is hot" is a sentence while

"The nice morning" is not.

It is common to distinguish between

sentence types and sentence tokens.

Thus, by writing "The sun is

hot", "The sun is hot", one might say that there is one sentence type
inscribed twice or that there are two sentence tokens.

The distinction between sentence-tokens and sentence-types is one
of the reasons why sentences should be rejected as possible candidates
for 'truth-bearers'.

It is not clear to which of those two entities

the truth values should be attributed.

Another argument against their

candidature for truth-bearers is that sentences are dependent on the
underlying language and physical existence.

Consider the analogy with the numerals and numbers, where the
former represent sentences and the later propositions.

To numbers

mathematical properties are easily assigned, to numerals it is
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meaningless to do so.
cease to exist.

Sentences can be inscribed and erased, and thus

The propositions expressed by those sentences will

still be present and true.

The sentence "The sun is hot" could be

written in Serbo-Croatian such as "Sunce je toplo" and express the
same proposition as the former sentence does; an indication that there
is no one-to-one correspodence between sentences and propositions.
The same proposition can be expressed by different sentences.

The

extra-linguistic character makes the propositions suitable for
knowledge-carriers, a fortiori truth-bearers.

The independence of knowledge from any particular language being
used to express it is what was termed in the PROLEGOMENA as an
extra-system significance of knowledge.

There are arguments (Church

[9], Bradley and Swartz {5]) that no qualification is to be assigned
to propositions other than defining them as abstract entities capable
of truth and falsity.

This is far too 'abstract*.

Therefore, each proposition is identified with a set of possible
complexes in which the proposition is true.

In other words, a

proposition is a function from the set of possible complexes to the
set 2.

Hence, a plausible epistemic context of a reasoning agent is a

set of propositions in which every proposition is a set of complexes
in which the proposition is 'true'.

An identification of the object of knowledge as a set of possible
complexes is not without its problems.
propositions:

Consider the following two
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n^: "Two plus two is four."
112- "The earth is round."

Denote with <j>\ and 4>2 , the sentences expressing the two
propositions

and 112 respectively.

If the sentence <j>= 4>]_ <-> <j>2

is

logically true then the sentences <t>^ and 4>2 are logically equivalent.
This entails that the propositions FI^ and Il2 are logically
equivalent.

The logical equivalence of 11^ and 112 implies that they

are true in the same set of possible complexes.

Why is it so ?

The

relation between propositions and complexes equates the notions of
logical equivalence and semantic equivalence.

Thus is not possible to

distinguish between a propositional equivalence and an propositional
identity.

The phenomenon is a consequence of set theory, where each

set is uniquely determined by its members.
and they have the same members then

If S]^ and S 2 are two sets

= S2 -

But the propositions II^ and 112 are far from being identical.
Although both true, they have entirely different contexts of
information and convey different meanings.

To better understand the

difficult problem of propositional identity it is necessary to explore
the ontological status of the propositions.

3.

Concepts.

To assert that an entity has an ontological status

is to recognize the existence of its intrinsic structure.

The

structure then can be contrasted with other entities of the same or
different types.

An example of the later was the analysis of

sentences and propositions.

So the focus here is on entities of the

same type, i. e., propositions.
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The existence of an inner structure entails two different
characteristics of an entity with reference to the complexity of its
structure.

When the structure of an entity is reducible to more

primitive entities'than the original entity is a compound entity or
molecular one.

When the original structure is irreducible to more

primitive entities then one speaks about atomic entities.

For propositions, the argument put forward is the following:
propositions are compound entities and their essential constituents
are concepts.

Regarding the concepts as primitive constructs of

propositions does not imply that concepts themselves do not possess
inner complexity on their own.

A concept may or may not be the

subject of further logical analysis.

Certain concepts may also entail

the existence of other concepts which fall under the the original
concepts.

Chronologically, the notion of concept is among the primal
entities in the vocabulary of reasoning [5].

Concepts have always

been suitable as a reference but quite elusive for a rigorous
definition.

It is quite possible there is no definition.

McCarthy

[41] openly admits of using the term 'concept' in the study of
first-order theories without any attempt to discuss it.

However, the

acceptance of concepts as essential entities does not prevent us from
giving at least some explanatory account of their 'existence'.

Certains authors [5, 14] think that it is important to
disassociate concepts from conceptions and ideas.

They apply to

concepts the same type of 'abstract detachment' as they do to
propositions.

It is true that conceptions and ideas could basically
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be treated as psychological entities which mirror some internal
'mental state' of an agent.

But to deny them any role in the

formulation of concepts amounts to the denial of possibility in the
process of reasoning.

What is important to realize is that concepts

have the same kind of extra-linguistic property as propositions do.

Just what kind of entities are used to express concepts?
general agreement is that there are two [5, 46].

The

Expressions of

reference, which can be undetermined such as "something" or
"everyone", or determined such as "John" or "morning star".

Also,

propositional functions (or open sentences) which contain a locus
which is later substituted with a referring expression.

Consider the

following proposition:

n : "The color of blood is red."

In this case the referring expression is "the color of blood" and the
propositional function is "... is red".

The set of concepts that

appear in the proposition n is {being a color, being a blood, being
red].

No truth truth assignment could be given to propositional

functions.

A distinction, therefore, should be made between open

sentences which are concept-expressing entities and closed sentences
used to express propositions and are subject to an assignment of
truth-value.

As Quine [46] pointed out, any closed sentence could be
transformed to an open sentence.
transformation yields:

For the proposition P the
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TI7:

"x is the color of the blood and x is red."

Identifying propositions with a set of complexes in which the
propositions were true has a two-fold implication with respect to
concepts.

First, concepts are related to the complexes through the

propositions of which they are essential constituents.

Second, in

view of the fact that propositions were knowledge-carriers, concepts
must be considered as constituents of knowledge.

In essence, concepts

are the primary building blocks of of knowledge.

With reference to the inner complexity of concepts a distinction
is made between linear and non-linear concepts.

Simpliciter, a

concept is linear if it is not subject to logical analysis; a concept
is non-linear if it is.

By a logical analysis understand the process

of reduction of a concept to another concept which is a synonym or an
epistemic alternative of the original concept.

A necessary or analytic truth is one that holds in all complexes.
For example, consider the concepts 'mother' and 'green'.

The claim is

that the concept of a mother is a non-linear one and the concept of
green is a linear one.

A possible logical analysis of the concept of

a mother is a 'female-parent', but no parallel analysis is applicable
to the concept of being green.

Someone may argue that analysis of

'green* could produce another concepts like 'wavelength',
'reflection', and 'absorption'.

These are synthetic or contingent

truths because these truths are dependent on the existence of
'greeness' in the resonant complex.

A resonant complex is a complex

in which the logical and physical truth are coextensive.

It will be

correct to accept that the resonant complex represents reality.
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The question of synonymity is very important and extremely
difficult.

Intensions are not sufficient for a satisfactory treatment

of synonymity.

Therefore, no distinction is going to be made between

identical and synonymous propositions.

Other than synonymity, there are many modal-like relations that
could be defined among concepts.

and A 2

Thus given two concepts

the relations of agreeability, disagreeability, universal
agreeability, relevance, and universal relevance can be defined.

Concept A^ is agreeable with concept A£ if and only if

there is

at least one complex in which both concepts A^ and A 2 apply to the
same entity. For example, the concepts of being a professor and him
knowing the subject that he is teaching.

Concepts A]_ and A 2 are disagreeable if and only if there is no a
complex in which both concepts apply to the same entity.

The concept

of bachelor and the concept of being married is an example of
disagreeable concepts.

Concepts A^ and A 2 are universally agreeable if and only if there
is no complex in which the application of A]^ to an entity does not
entail the application of A 2 to the same entity.

The propositions

n l : " Paul and John have one parent in common."
112= "Paul and John are step-siblings."

contain respectively the concepts of "having one parent in common" and
"being step-siblings".

One can observe that if the first concept

applies to some entities (for example Paul and John) the second one
applies to the same entities by necessity.
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A concept A is relevant if and only if there is an entity in at
least one complex that falls under the concept A.

The example of a

relevant concept is the concept of being divisible by two.

A concept A is universally relevant if there is at least one
entity in each possible complex that falls under the concept A.

The

concept of self-identity is an example of universally relevant
concept, assuming of course that each complex contains at least one
entity.

Concepts are potentials for knowledge depending on the existence
of an entity that might possibly fall under the concept.
a selector.

A concept is

It selects entities from the universe of all possible

entities and those entities represent its extension.
is empty then the extension is the empty set.
concept is the concept of "a round square".

If the concept

An example of an empty
The concept of a round

square is empty because the concept is logically impossible.

The argument put forward by Bradley and Swartz is that the
decomposition of a proposition to concepts is order-sensitive [5].
For instance, take the proposition

ri: "John was on the top of Jim."

and assume that the proposition n is true.

Some of the possible

combinations for the concepts that appear in the proposition n are
represented by the following sets of concepts {being John, being on
the top, being Jim], {being Jim, being on the top, being John}, and
{being John, being Jim, being on the top}.

The first set of concepts
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reflects the proposition P, while the second set of concepts yields
another proposition:

X: "Jim was on the top of John."

The third set of concepts is not determined at all with respect to the
original meaning of the proposition n.

An analogy underlining the distinction between ordered and
unordered sets of concepts can be found in geography.
given the assignment to visit some cities.

An agent is

To know the ordering is

like having a complete map of the tour with all the cities and the
roads that interconnect.

Here concepts represent cities.

To have

concepts without an ordering amounts to being a conscious only that
the cities might exist on the map.

It may even be the case that a

road between some cities does not exist.

What is missing is the map

(or the appropriate mappings between the concepts).

To conclude, a proposition may be defined as an ordered sequence
of concepts subject to a truth-value assignment.

The prima facie denial of the attribution of truth values to
concepts should not be understood as too categorical.

The role of the

concepts as the building blocks of knowledge must essentially be
recognized through a formal system that can deal with concepts.
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B.

A ZEROTH-ORDER THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

" . . . but we need notions,
not notations."
A. Tarski

1.

Criteria for Conceptual Satisfaction.

Consciousness about

concepts is a first level of reasoning leading towards knowledge.

But

open sentences and propositional functions, which are the principle
devices to express concepts, can not be attributed truth-value.
Hence, we stipulate the existence of minimal concept expressing
propositions.

For every possibly non-empty concept A denote by n o its

corresponding 'minimal proposition of concept expression ' which has
the form "The concept of
.".

...

exists" or "There is a concept of . .

The gap is to be substituted with any concept.

For instance, if

the particular concept is a car then the corresponding minimal
proposition of concept expression is "There is a concept of a car".
The predication of existence in the minimal proposition of concept
expression is to be understood to vary over possible entities.

The

set of actual entities is a subset of the set of possible entities.

By a language of consciousness Lc is understood a language of
which the symbols are drawn from the following categories:

[1]

Improper symbols as defined for the system P;

[2]

A denumerable set of minimal concept expressing
propositions n c = {p, q, r, ... }

[3]

A monadic operator of consciousness 'CON*
(read 'conscious of');

[4]

Individual variables ranging over a denumerable set of
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all reasoning agents PA = {aj_, ..., aa , .-.}

The formulas of Lc are denoted by p , ..., f, g, h, ...

Let T(LC)

be the set of all formulas of Lc which is the smallest set that
contains n c , is closed under the logical connectives and contains
a CON(f) whenever £ e T(LC) and a e PA.

The standard notation for expressing epistemic notions as an
empirical relation between an agent and a proposition is slightly
modified.

This is done to prevent any ambiguity relative to whether

or not an agent is in the scope of an epistemic operator.

Therefore,

the term ' aCON(p) 'is a formal counterpart of "an agent 'a' is
conscious of p " .

A conceptual structure for Lc is a tuple M = < K , <I>, ©, V> where:

[1]

K is a nonempty set of complexes;

[2]

Let p(K) be the power set of K, i. e., the set of all sets of

possible complexes.

Then $ is a function from the set FIC to the set

p(K), that is

<I>: n c ~*p(K)
The function <t> provides each minimal concept expressing proposition
with an intension;
[3]

© is a function from fa] x K to the set p(p(K)), viz., the

function © assigns to an agent 'a' who is in the complex k the set of
all minimal concept expressing propositions that an agent is conscious
of in the complex k.

In a multi-agent case the function © is defined

as:
©: PA x K -* p(p(K))
instead of
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0:
[4]

{a} x K -» p(p(K))

V is a function of confirmation (or valuation)
V: T(LC ) x K -

2

such that:
(a)

V(p, k) = 1 if and only if p

(b)

For any wff f and any complex k, V(--f, k) = 1 if and only

e

I“Ic and k e <h(p)

if V(f, k) = 0;
(c)

For any two wffs f and g and any complex k, V(f & g, k) = 1

if and only if V(f, k) = 1 and V(g, k) = 1;
(d)

For any wff f and any complex k, V( aC0N(f), k) = 1 if

and only if the INT(f) e ©(a, k).
Intuitively, the INT(f) of any wff f e r(Lc) determines a set of
complexes which is a subset of K, where the wff f

is 'inevitable'.

The intension of f is interpreted as a set of complexes that confirm
f.

So for an arbitrary wff f INT(f) = {k: M, k|= f}.

conceptual structure M

and a complex k e K,

Given a

the expressions V(f, k) =

1 under the interpretation M and M, k |= f are identical.

The role

of the functions <J> and © is explained in the Example 1.

Example 1.

Let K = {i, j} be a set of complexes and let

n c = { p, q, r} be a set of concept expressing propositions.

The range

of <I> is the set p(K) = {A, {i}, {j}, {i, j}}, where A denotes the
empty set.

The intensions to the elements of n c are arbitrarily

assigned such that INT(p) = {i}, INT(q) = {j}, INT(r} = {i, j}.

The

range of © is the set p(p(K)) = {A, {A}, {{i}}, U j M ,

1 A

{i} }, { A , {j}}, { A
j}}, Ui},
{j}>

{j},

jn, { A

, {x, j}}, Hi},

{j}}, H i ] ,

j}}> { A , fi}, {j}}, { A , m ,
, {i}, {j}, {i, j}}}.

Hi. j}L

{x, j}}, {{j},

U,

jn,

To realize the unique

{ A

{i,
,

,
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relation between propositions and complexes let us express p(p(K)) in
terms of the propositions p, q, and r.

Now, the range of © becomes

the set />(p(K)) = {A, {A}, {p}, {q}, {r}, { A , p} , { A , q} , { A ,
r}, {p, q}, {p, r}, [q, r}, fp, q, r}, { A , p, q}, { A , p, r}, { A
q, r} , { A , p, q, r}}.

,

Let the value of © at the complex i for an

agent 'a' be ©(a, i) = {p, q, r}.

This means that an agent 'a' is

conscious of three concepts in a complex i.

For each complex i, the

value ©(a, i) determines a unique set of consciousness that is
assigned to a reasoning agent.

By imposing certain restrictions to

the sets of consciousness one can capture different modes for
reasoning about consciousness.

For instance, if A e © ( a ,

agent *a' can be conscious of the impossible.

i) then an

When ©(a, i) = A then an

agent 'a' residing in a complex i is in a state of complete ignorance.

Assume that K is a non empty set of complexes and that each
complex k has at least one entity.

Let p, q, and r are concept

expressing propositions associated with the concepts Ap, Aq, A r
respectively.

Thus, the modal relations among concepts in terms of

intensions are:

•Two concepts Ap and Aq are agreeable if and only if
INT(p) f| INT(q)*A.

•Two concepts Ap and Aq are disagreeable if and only if
INT(p) D INT(q) = A.

•Two concepts Ap and Aq are universally agreeable if and only if
INT(p) = INT(q).
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•A concept A r is relevant if and only if INT(r)^A.

•A concept A r is universally relevant if and only if INT(r) s K .

Similarly, the definition of a proposition as an ordered sequence
of concepts is defined in terms of intensions:

•An intension of a proposition is the intersection of intensions
of all the concept expressing propositions which constitute the
proposition.

How does a conceptual structure M differ from a standard Kripke
structure KS for reasoning about knowledge?

Recall that Kripke

structure is a tuple KS = <K, KR, R, V> where K is the nonempty set of
possible complexes; KR is the 'actual' world or the resonant complex .
R is a relation of accessibility and V a valuation function.

The

relation of accessibility R is not an element of the conceptual
structure M.

Therefore, epistemic notions such as knowledge and

consciousness or doxastic notions such as belief and awareness are not
modelled as a relation between two complexes.

Is there any penalty in the case of intensional approach for
excluding the relation of accessibility?

It appears that the

reasoning agent has been deprived from his 'interworld' intuition.
The relation of accessibility was the one that provided an agent with
a set of epistemic alternatives.
represents some fact.

For consider a wff f which

An agent knows the fact f, if and only if f is

true in all complexes which are conceivable for the agent from a
complex k.
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But a reasoning agent still has its 'intensional' intuition.
Consider two wff f and g such that INT(f) s INT(g).
is true then aCON(g) is also true.

Provided a CON(f)

As expected, in the intensional

paradigm a reasoning agent has lost the ability to distinguish between
logically equivalent formulas.

A modal type of omniscience has been replaced with an intensional
'omniscience'.

While it is desirable to be conscious of concepts

which are epistemic alternatives to each other, the side-effect of the
intensional approach is counterintuitive and largely idealized.
Moreover, there is no satisfactory way to deal with the phenomenon of
omniscience with a single primitive qualifier such as a complex and to
remain faithful to the pure intensional paradigm.

2.

Axiomatization and Determinism.

To say that a system is

axiomatizable is to state that there is a set of wff T (ordinary those
are the axioms of the system) such that members of the system are
those wffs derived from T by an acceptable rules of inference.

If the

principal of wffs is finite then the system is finitely axiomatizable.

The fundamental system Sc for reasoning about consciousness is
finitely axiomatizable.

The system Sc is defined by the following

axiom schemas and rules of inference:

(PC) All propositional tautologies
(RE) From f <-> g infer aCON(f) <-> aCON(g)

The axioms (PC) are credit from propositional reasoning.

The rule of

inference (RE) is actually the rule of substitution of equivalents.
The Rule (RE) is a consequence of the intensional approach in the
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formulation of the system Sc .
system is clear:

The attribution of fundamental to the

the reasoning power of an agent 'a' is a minimal one

due to the absence of the modes of reasoning introduced in the
classical theory of knowledge.

It is interesting that validity in the semantics of possible
complexes is a three-fold phenomenon.

First, one can speak about a

local validity of a wff formula f, i. e., when a formula f is valid in
a complex k.

A wff f is structurally valid if and only if f is valid

in all complexes belonging to a structure or a model.

Finally, a

global validity of a wff f is defined with respect to a class of
conceptual structures or models £1(M).

The global validity

corresponds to the idea of universal validity in the propositional
system P.

A system Sc for LC (or the Logic of Consciousness) is said to be
sound with respect to a class of conceptual structures £1(M) if and
only if every theorem of Sc is valid in £1(M).

The system Sc is

complete in LC if and only if every valid formula f in fl(M) is a
theorem of the system.

To prove that the system Sc is determined in

LC, i. e., sound and complete, we need a few definitions and two
lemmas which have become a standard [25, 31, 68] in all the proofs
pertaining to determinism.

A wff f is Sc inconsistent if |- -»f is a theorem of Sc .
is Sc consistent if -j -f in Sc .
extended to a set of formulas.
formulas.

A wff f

The idea of Sc consistency can be
Let Y denote a set of well formed

If Y is finite, i. e. , Y=[f^,...,

for a conduction of the formulas of Y.

fj,.} then C(Y) stands

The set of formulas
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Y is Sc inconsistent

if and only if -j -• C(Y) in Sc .

When Y is an

infinite set, define the Sc consistency in the following manner: the
set Y is Sc consistent if and only if every finite subset of Y is
Sc consistent.

A set of formulas Y is called maximal if and only if

for every formula f e Y , either f e Y or -f e Y.

The set of formulas

is called maximal Sc consistent, denoted by MAX (Y), if and
is both maximal and Sc consistent.
is maximal Sc consistent

Y

only if Y

In other words, a set of formulas

if and only if any other conceivable

extension will make it inconsistent.
Given a formula f er(Lc), relative to the system Sc , a proof set
of |f| is the set of all MAX(Y) sets of formulas containing

f [8].

The next two lemmas are given without a proof.

Lemma 1:

Suppose that Y is MAX(Y) set of formulas with respect

to
the system Sc .

Then

(a) f e Y if and only if “*f ^Y
(b) f & g e Y if and only if f e Y and g e Y
(c) f <-> g e Y if and only if f e Y if and only if g e Y
(d) Every theorem of Sc is in Y

Lemma 2:

Every Sc consistent

set of formulas Y has a maximal Sc

consistent extension.

Proposition 1:

The system Sc is determined with respect to

a class of conceptual structures fl(M).
Proof:
( i) (soundness)
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The soundness of the system follows from the fact that it
contains
all the axioms of (PC) which are tautologies.
inference (RE) preserves validity.

Also, the rule of

For consider a class of conceptual

structures fl(M) such that f <-> g is valid, i. e., |= f <-> g.
last assertion holds if and only if INT(f) = INT(g).

The

Then for any

complex k and any set of consciousness 0(a, k) in an arbitrary
conceptual structure M,
INT(g) e ©(a, k ) .

INT(f) e ©(a, k) if and only if

Thus for all complexes k, V(aCON(f), k) = 1

only if V(aCON(g), k) = 1

if and

which implies that |= aCON(f) <-> a CON( f)

for all Mefi(M).
(ii) (completeness)
Consider the following tuple M = <K, <I>, ©, V> where:
[1]

K is a nonempty set of complexes and each complex is maximal

Sc consistent set of formulas;

[2]

<t>:

n c - P(K)

[3]

©:

[4]

V is a function of confirmation

{a}

x K -p(p(K ))

V: r(Lc ) x K -

2

such that:
(a)

V(p, k) = 1 if and only if p e n c and k e <I>(p)

(b)

For any wff f and any complex k, V(-*f, k) = 1 if and only

if V(f, k) = 0;
(c)

For any two wffs f and g and any complex k, V(f & g, k) = 1

if and only if V(f, k) = 1 and V(g, k) = 1;
(d)

For any wff f and any complex k, V( a C0N(f), k) = 1 if

and only if the INT(f) « ©(a, k ) .
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The proof rests on the fact that the LC is based on on the
intensional logic.

If so, then the following assumption is correct:

for any complex k and any wff f, f e k if and only if |f| e ©(a, k).
The intension of any wff f consists of all those complexes k that
confirm f.

If each complex k is MAX it follows that INT(f) = |f|.

Otherwise, INT(f) will not include all the complexes that confirm f.
The case when f = a C0N(g) such that C0N(g)a e k if and only if
|g| e 0(a, k)

follows from the definition of a conceptual structure M

part ([4], (d)) and the validity of Rule (RE).

The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of a wff
f e r(Lc).

One has to show that for every k e K and every f e r(Lc) the

relation (**) holds:

(**)

V(f, k) = 1 if and only if f ek.

Case 1:

Let f = p.

V(p, k) = 1 iff k e <t>(p) and so k eINT(p).

Since INT(p) = |p|, it follows that p e k.

Case 2:

Let f = -’f. Then (**) follows

Case 3:

Let f = g & h.

from Lemma 1(a).

Then (**) is a consequence of Lemma

Case 4: Consider that f = aC0N(g).

1(b).

Let the relation (**) hold

for f = g. By the inductive hypothesis V(g, k) =1 and INT(g) = ]g|, so
for every k whenever INT(g) e ©(a, k)

so is |g| e ©(a, k).

From the

definition of conceptual structure, part ([4](d)), INT(g) e 0(a, k) if
and only if V( a C0N(g), k) = 1

if and only if aC0N(g) ek.
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Suppose that f, g e r(Lc) and V(f <-> g, k) = 1 for every

Case 5:
k eK.

From (**) follows that f <-> g e k for every k e K .

So f <-> g

belongs to every k where k is MAX(k, whence f <r> g is a theorem of
Sc .

By Lemma 1(c) then for every k e K,

f e k if and only if g ek.

Using the rule (RE) if f <-> g is a theorem of Sc so is
a CON(f) <-> a CON(f) a theorem of Sc -

Therefore,

a CON(f) <-> a CON(f)ek for all k e K.

Hence M

is a conceptual structure for Sc .

Sc valid formula, then V(f, k) = 1 for all k e K .
that f e k for all k e K .

If e T(LC ) and

f is

From (**) follows

But each k e K is MAX set of wff.

Applying

Lemma 1(d) yields that f is a theorem of Sc , i. e., provable in Sc -«

Corollary 1:

A set of formulas Y of LC is Sc consistent if and

only if Y is Scsatisfiable.
Proof:

(only if)

Let M be a conceptual structure as defined in Proposition 1.
Since Y is Sc consistent then Y is a subset of some k e K .
V(f, k) = 1 for every f e Y.

Therefore,

Thus Y is satisfiable.

(if)
Let Y be Sc satisfiable.
1 for some k e K .

V(f, k) =

The last assertion states that if f is satisfiable,

f is certainly not.
the system Sc .

Then for any formula f e Y,

So Y is consistent with respect to negation in
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The system Sc in LC is decidable if there is effective procedure
for deciding whether or not a wff f in LC is a theorem in Sc .

The

methodology is similar to the one introduced by Chellas [8] with
respect to classical modal systems.

To prove decidability one

requires that the notions of axiomatizability and conceptual structure
finiteness are recognized by the system.

The system Sc in LC is axiomatizable and all its axioms are
decidable (follows from the decidability of PC).
reasonable rule of inference.

The rule (RE) is a

It always determines the relation

between premises and the conclusion.

The axiomatizability Sc provides

for a positive test of provability (or a theoremhood) in the system
Sc -

Thus, the existence of a positive test for theoremhood qualifies

the system as semi- decidable.

In order to be fully decidable, simpliciter decidable, the system
Sc along with its complete axiomatization must have the property of
having a conceptual structure which is finite.

The finiteness of the

structure provides a negative test for provability in the system.

A conceptual structure is finite if and only if K has a finite
number of complexes; otherwise the conceptual structure is infinite.
Let £1(M) be a class of conceptual structures for Sc .

Imposing a

standard enumeration on the elements of i2(M) yields
M]_, .. . ,M^,

...

The class is enumerable, since each M-^ is finite.

The test for negative theoremhood is now reduced to finding an
which is a conceptual structure and showing that some wff f is
falsified in M^.

That the both tasks are finite is due to the fact

that the axiomatization is finite and the models are finite.

If the
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number of complexes is n (where n is a finite number) then the
corresponding conceptual structure has at most 2n complexes.

Since

the decidability problem is co-NP-complete the tractability of the
problem should be understood in principle and not in practice.

Proposition 2:

3.

The system Sc of LC is decidable.

Modes for Reasoning.

The ability to reason for an agent in

the system Sc , other than the standard axioms of (PC) and the Rule
(RE) is quite limited.

It is a compromise between the flexibility and

generality of the intensional approach and the rigid power of modal
logic systems such as S4 or S5.

We find this to be consistent with

the heuristic approach in AI.

A restriction of the class of conceptual structures £1(M) with
respect to which the system Sc is determined will increase the number
of logical 'devices' (axioms or theorems) in the system.

The

restrictions are accomplished by imposing plastic constraints on the
sets of of consciousness {© (a, k)} .

The constraints are termed

plastic since as long as they hold for a particular system the system
is determined.

The class of conceptual structures for which the

system is determined with respect to a plastic constraint is denoted
by Q ( M r ) where £l(Mr ) is a subset of £i(M).

The axioms of the

restricted system are actually metatheorems of the generalized system
£1(M).

Some of the acceptable modes of reasoning about consciousness

are presented below.
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Mode 1:(Consciousness about impossible)
in Example 1.

This mode was introduced

The plastic constraint imposed on an arbitrary set of

consciousness © (a, k) is:

PCI:

A e ©(a, k)

For an agent to be conscious of the impossible means that it is
conscious of a wff formula g such that g -> f & -*f.

Let the intension

of f to be INT(f) and define the intension of -f to be INT(-f) =
K — INT(f).

Denote the intension of -■f with CINT(f), whence CINT(f) is

a complement of INT(f) with respect to the set of all complexes K.
The formula g is inconsistent since (f & ->f) is canonically
unsatisfiable where INT(f) f) CINT(f) = A .

There are situations in a reasoning space of an agent that is
encompassed by a KB which may be declared to be inaccessible or
impossible to be encountered.

These situations, which are described

by formulas of type g, then will eventually lead to either a
destruction of the reasoning mechanism (such as in a robot) or to
violation of the entire KB.

Prima facie there is a utility in the

requirement that a reasoning agent be conscious of the impossible.

The mode of reasoning about the impossible, however, is
inadmissable in a doxastic context.

One cannot believe "Unicorn

exists" and "Unicorn does not exist" in the same complex k.

A

distinction should also be made between the formulas (aCON(f) and
a CON(-"f)) and aCON(f & -f) which are entirely different modes of
reasoning.

The later mode requires a time resonant interval for the

wffs f and -’f, while the former mode refers to two different time
intervals, regardless of how infinitesimal that interval difference
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is.

The argument against being conscious of the impossible comes from

the behavior of canonically unsatisfiable formula (or contradiction)
in standard propositional calculus.

Anything is derivable from a

contradiction which is the reason why propositional logic is so
concerned about consistency.

So the implication is clear.

If an

agent is conscious of the impossible it is conscious of everything
possible.

This makes the (MT1) inappropriate for its inclusion in the

system of knowledge.

Mode 2:(Distribution of consciousness)

The process of reasoning

from universal facts toward particular facts is accomplished by the
metatheorem:

MT2: aCON(f & g) ->

aCON(f) & aCON(g)

which is true if

PC2: If INT(f) n INT(g) e ©(a, k) then INT(f) e ©(a, k)
and INT(g) e ©(a, k)

holds.

The distribution of consciousness is unproblematic.

One can

modify the 'then' part of PC2 by dropping either the INT(f) or the
INT(g) to get a single importation.

Mode 3:(Collection of consciousness)
the converse of the Mode 2.

Evidently, the Mode 3 is

In this case one has captured the

process of reasoning from particular facts toward universal facts.

MT3: aCON(f) & a CON(g) ->

a CON(f & g)
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which is true if

PC3: If INT(f) 6 0(a, k) and INT(g) e ©(a, k)
then INT(f) fl INT(g) e ©(a, k)

holds.

It is an unproblematic mode from the intuitive point of view.

A substitution of the "if ... then" condition in either one of the
plastic constraints PC2 and PC3 with an "if and only if" condition
will yield both modes of reasoning (MT2 and MT3) in a single mode.

Mode 4:(The Omniconsciousness of Truth)

If a reasoning agent is

to recognize canonically true things, denoted by T, then a fairly
simple constraint is to be met:

MT4: aCON(T)

if

PC4: K e © ( a , k)

A canonically true formula is true in every complex.

Therefore,

the intension of T must be the set of all possible complexes, i. e.,
INT(T) = K .

Mode 5:(Conscious about Consciousness)
iteration of consciousness operators.
introspection has the form:

MTS: aCON(f) ->

and is valid

aCON(CON(f))

This mode involves

The metatheorem of positive
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A

PC5: if INT(f)e 6(a, k) then there exist a set of complexes K
such that K = {i| INT(f) e 0(a, i)} and K e ©(a, k).

The arguments against the acceptance of the axiom of positive
introspection in an epistemic context are few.

They are usually due

to the psychological phenomena of subconsciousness and repression.
The existence of these phenomena is rather speculative even with
respect to human intellect.

To discuss the subconsciousness and the

repression in connection with the artifact reasoning is probably
unacceptable at the moment.

There may be some technical difficulties, however, with the
realization of either positive or negative introspection.

Let the

number of epistemic operators on the left side of (MT5) be denoted by <5
which stands for a degree of reasoning about consciousness or
knowledge.

One can observe that degree of reasoning 6 always induces a

higher degree of reasoning 6 + 1.

The higher degree of reasoning is
A

reflected in the existence of the set K which requires that the
cardinality of the set of consciousness ©(a, k) to be increased.

So,

in general, if one wants to have an unlimited degree of reasoning then
the sets of consciousness must be infinite.

Mode 6:(Conscious about the Unconsciousness)

The mode for

negative introspection, i. e. , to be unconscious implies to be
conscious about something that you are unconscious off is somewhat of
a linguistic circus and caveat.

But the difficult admission of this

peculiar linguistic expression is not a sufficient reason for the mode
of negative introspection to be rejected in reasoning by artifacts.
The negative introspection is formalized as follows:
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MT6: a -CON(f) ->

aCON(-CON(f))

and is valid
A

PC6: if INT(f)4©(a, k) then there exist a set of complexes K
such that K =

{i| INT(f) ^©(a, i)} and K e ©(a, k).

Consider that r(Lc) is augmented with another monadic operator
'AWE* so that if a wff f e r(Lc) then aAWE(f)

er(Lc). The dual of the

consciousness operator 'CON' is the operator of awareness 'AWE* such
that:

V( aAWE(f), k) = 1 if and only if CINT(f) ^0(a, k).

The difference between the two inclinations, consciousness and
awareness, is a difference between definitive and possible
information.

Given a complex k, a reasoning agent 'a', and a wff f,

by the definition of consciousness for 'a' to be conscious of f means
that the INT(f) e 0(a, k).

The epistemic operator 'CON' is a sort of existential quantifier
over the set of possible concepts and hence complexes for an agent.
Various concepts may exist within a KB.

However, they do exist for an

agent 'a' if and only if the concepts are members of an agent's set of
consciousness for some k e K .

In the case of awareness, an agent is

aware of a formula f if the complement of the intension of f is not
element of its set of awareness.

There is no guarantee that the

intension of f is in its set of awareness.
"the grass is green" in a complex k.

Let 'a' be conscious that

The agent 'a' is aware that "the

grass is green" in a complex k if and only if 'a' is not conscious
that "the grass is not green".
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The problem with notions such as negative introspection and
awareness is. beyond the intuitive admissability.

The theoretical

basis for both negative introspection and awareness is somehow
superfluous and troublesome.

The reason is that with modalities there

is no 'a clear cut negation' as there is one in classical logic.

A

comparative study of the plastic constraint (PC6) and the condition
for awareness reveals the effect of negating an epistemic operator.
Thus, the negative introspection can alternatively be formulated as:

MT6: aAWE(f) ->

aCON(AWE(f))

The definition is consistent with the idea- of duality in modal and
intensional theories.

Absence of consciousness does not entail total

ignorance about certain concept.

It does entail that there is a

possibility, no matter how small, that a concept is accessible.

C.

A ZEROTH ORDER THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

"The most efficient way to solve a
a problem is to already know how to
solve it. Then one can eliminate search
entirely."
The Society of Mind, Marvin Minsky

1.

Criteria for Epistemic Satisfaction.

By an epistemic

language Le is understood a language of which the symbols are drawn
from the following categories:

[1]

Improper symbols as defined for the system P;

[2]

A denumerable set of atomic propositions Ile .
The elements are:

[3]

p, q, r, . . .

A monadic operator of knowledge 'KNOW1
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(read 'know');
A monadic operator of consciousness 'CON'
(read 'conscious o f ');
[4]

Individual variables ranging over a denumerable set of
reasoning agents PA = [a^,..., a± , ••-}

The formulas of Le are denoted by p,..., f, g, h, ...

Let T(Le )

be the set of all formulas of Le which is the smallest set that
contains n e , is closed under the logical connectives and contains
aKN0W(f) and aC0N(f) whenever f e T(Le) and aePA. The set of minimal
concept propositions n c is a subset of the set of all atomic
propositions n e .

An epistemic structure for Le is a tuple E = <K, O, 0, V> where:

[1]

K is a nonempty set of complexes;

[2]

The function <I> provides each atomic proposition with its

intension:
<t>: n a - p(K)

[3]

The function © assigns to a reasoning agent its knowledge

set:
©: {a} x K -* />(p(K) )
[4]

V is a function of confirmation
V: T(Le ) x K -

2

such that:
(a)

V(p, k) = 1 if and only if p e n e and k e <I>(p)

(b)

For any wff f and any complex k, V(-'f, k) = 1 if and only

if V(f, k) = 0;
(c)

For any two wffs f and g and any complex k, V(f & g, k) = 1
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if and only if V(f, k) = 1 and V(g, k) = 1;
(d)

For any wff f and any complex k, V( aKNOW(f), k) = 1 if

and only if the INT(f) e0(a, k) and ke INT(f).

The condition for

knowing can be expressed through consciousness as:

for any wff f and

any complex k, V(aKNOW(f), k) = 1 if and only if V(aCON(f), k) = 1
and k e INT(f).

The difference between epistemic structures and conceptual
structures is reflected in the criteria ([4](d)) for confirmation.
The modification is necessary if the Axiom of Truth (AT)

(AT) aKNOW(f) -> f

is to be included in a formal system for the logic of knowledge (LK).
The Axiom of Truth underlines the metaphysical distinction between
consciousness and knowledge.

In the case of consciousness, where

©(a, k) is a set of propositions that an agent is conscious about in a
complex k, the complex is just an observation (or a reference) point
for an agent.

Consequently, it is not necessary for a complex k to be

included in the intension of any proposition which is a member of
©(a, k ) .

The complex k is detached from the consequences of the

consciousness.

When knowledge is involved, due to the distinction

that was made between knowledge and other cognitive phenomena such as
perceptions, beliefs, conceptions, the reference point such as the
complex k is affected by what an agent knows.

The propositions that

an agent knows must be 'true' in the complex in which the propositions
are known.
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A formal system Se for the LK is axiomatized as:

(PC) All propositional tautologies
(AT) aKNOW(f) -> f
(RE) From f <-> g infer aKNOW(f) <-> aKNOW(g)

Let f2(E) denote a class of epistemic structures.

Then the

following result holds for all epistemic structures Eefl(E).

Proposition 3: The system Se is determined with respect to £1(E).

Proof:

The proof of this proposition is quite similar to the one

in the Proposition 1.

Assume that every complex k is a MAX(f), i. e.,

is maximal consistent set of formulas

and f is wff.

( i) (soundness)

The case that matters is the Axiom of Truth.

Suppose that every

epistemic structure E satisfies the condition for knowledge ([4](d))
and that aKNOW(f) is a theorem at a complex k.

The last assertion

holds if INT(f) e0(a, k). From the condition ([4](b)) it follows that
k e INT(f).

This posits that f is true at k.

(ii) (completeness)

The important case to be proved is when a wff f = aKNOW(f).
other cases are reducible to the results from Lemma 1.
e ©(a, k)

All

Let INT(f)

from which follows that since every k is maximal consistent

set of formulas then INT(f) = |f|.
only if aKNOW(f) ek.

The last assertion is true if and

Applying the Axiom of Truth yields that f e k. ■
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The metatheorems (MT2) to (MT6) that were discussed concerning
the LC may accordingly be defined for the epistemic system and used as
a metatheorems in LK.

The metatheorems for knowledge are:

ME2: aKNOW(f & g) ->

aKNOW(f) & a KNOW(g)

ME3: aKNOW(f) & aKNOW(g) ->

a KNOW(f & g)

ME4: aKNOW(T)

ME5: aKNOW(f) ->

ME6 : a ->KNOW( f) ->

a KNOW(KNOW(f))

aKNOW(-KNOW( f))

The (MT1) is not even arguable in the case of knowledge.

It

contradicts the very basic assumption: every knowledge set 0(a, k)
must be consistent.

The acceptance

of (MT1) is a violation of the

Truth condition.

The Principle of Existence in LC asserts that:

A concept A

exists if and only if there is an agent who is conscious of the
concept.

Since the present research is primarily concerned with

modeling propositional or declarative knowledge, another important
principle may hold in general, the so-called Principle of Invariance
which says that: a knowledge set of a reasoning agent is invariant
with respect to any finite permutation of its constituent
propositions.

Assume that the Principle of Invariance does not hold for LC.
So, order-sensitivity is preserved in LC and one can give an
alternative formulation of knowing an atomic proposition from its
uniquely associated concept expressing propositions.

This formulation
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of knowing depends on the restrictive Principle of Linguistic
Competence:

all of the reasoning agents know the language they

communicate in.

Then given a valid formula f, the following result

holds in LC + LK:

(C & K)

CON(p) & CON(q) &

... CON(r) -> KNOW(f)

provided that: the order of p, q, ...» r is preserved and p, q, ... , r
are the only propositions appearing in f .

The INT(p) fl ••• fl INT(r) is

a subset of the INT(f), k e INT(f) and k e f| INT(p) where p is any of
the constituent concepts of f.

The result, due to the restrictions,

is not a particularly useful one.

Also, from a computational

standpoint, one may envision an infinite number of concept expression
propositions appearing in the valid formula f.

What about the interplay between the epistemic operators 'CON'
and 'KNOW' within the scope of one another?

According to the

definition of knowledge, consciousness is implied by knowledge.

Thus,

if an agent 'a' knows a fact represented by wff f, then the agent 'a'
is conscious of f.

The converse is not true.

The metatheorem (KC)

can be accepted as a global axiom of the knowledge system:

(KC)

aKNOW(f) -> aCON(f)

One point has to be made clear.

The interplay of epistemic operators,

although interesting because of various possible notions to be
depicted, can be quite problematic.

(CK)

aCON(KNOW(f))

For instance, consider
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By setting KNOW(f) equal to g, g = KNOW(f), then g is treated like any
other wff.

The original intent, to consider an epistemic inclination

as an empirical relation between an agent and a proposition is
preserved.

A plausible importation is obtained by applying (AT) to

(CK) in LC+LK which yields:

(CKC)

aCON(KNOW(f)) -> aCON(f)

The relation (CKC) is valid if the following plastic constraint is
A

satisfied: there exist a set of complexes K such that
K = {j : INT(f) e ©(a, j) & j e INT(f)} e ©(a, k) then INT(f) e 0(a, k) .
Similarily the importation:

(KCC)

aKNOW(CON(f)) -> aCON(f)

is valid if the (AT) is an axiom of LC+LK and the following constraint
is satisfied :

A

if there exist a set of complexes K such that

K = {j : INT(f) e ©(a, j)} then INT(f)e©(a, k), and

kelNT(f).

A somewhat weaker principle (KCK) can be obtained from (ME2)
which states that if an agent knows something then an agent is
conscious that it knows.

(KCK)

aKNOW(f) ->

aCON(KNOW(f))

The principle (KCK) requires that if INT(f) e ©(a, k) and kelNT(f)
A

then there exists a set of complexes K such that
K = {j : INT(f) e ©(a, j)} and K e 0(a, k ) .

No other combination of the

epistemic operators 'CON' and 'KNOW' is allowed in the system of
knowledge.
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2.

Entailed Knowledge.

The epistemic language Le is augmented

with another monadic epistemic operator 'EKNOW' (read 'explicitely
knows').
r(Le ).

Thus, for every wff f whenever f eT(Le ) so is EKNOW(f) e
The criteria for confirmation of entailed knowledge is:

(EK) V(aEKNOW(f), k) = 1 if and only if there exist a formula g
such that INT(g) e ©(a, k) and k e INT(g), and INT(g) is a subset of
INT(f).

A wff f is known by an agent at a complex k if and only if there
exist some other wff g at the complex k which entails the formula f.
The relation of entailment, viz., 'p entails q', is a converse of the
relation 'q logically follows from p*.
role in modal and relevance logic.

The entailment plays a crucial

It was introduced in logic to

avoid the paradoxes of material implication (denoted in this research
with p -> q) which is read as "if it is not the case that p and not
q".

The strict implication in modal logic is read as "if it is

impossible that p and not q".

In relevance logic (like modal logics there is a whole family of
relevance logics [23]) it is recognized that entailment is a converse
of deducibility.

Moreover, relevance logicians argue that the notion

of deducibility in the classical logic is defective, because the
question of relevance is ignored.

So for instance, in terms of the

logic of relevance, q is deducible from p if and only if the
derivation of q uses p.

The digression in in relevance logic was

necessary to underline the importance of entailment in any kind of
reasoning and particularly about knowledge.
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Assume that there is a knowledge base (KB) which is queried with
the question: does the grass have any color?

If the reasoning is

based on entailment then the answer is a result of the existence of a
proposition in KB asserting that "the grass is green".

The reasoning

is based on the idea that a fact is known which necessarily entails
another fact.

An entailed fact is usually more general one than a

fact that entails. For instance, being green entails being colored,
but being colored does not entail being green.

Intuitively, one may

conclude that it is implicit knowledge that is modelled not an
explicit one.
example.

But recall the answer given by the KB in the above

That the grass is colored was entailed by an explicit fact

in KB that the grass is green.

Let £1(EX ) represent a class of entailed (or explicit) epistemic
structures.

Suppose that each fl(Ex ) is defined precisely in the same

manner as the ordinary epistemic structures with the exception of the
condition ([4](d)).

Then the following propositions are true.

Proposition 5: If |= f -> g ( f entails g) is a valid formula in
Q(EX ) then |= aEKNOW(f) -> aEKNOW(g) is a valid formula in £1(EX ).

Proof: Assume that |= f -> g is valid in £2(EX ) which implies that
INT(f) is a subset of INT(g).
e ©(a, k) and keINT(h).

Let h be a wff formula such that INT(h)

If INT(h) is a subset of INT(f), then by the

euclidian property of inclusion, INT(h) is a subset of INT(g).
for every k e K

Hence,

if V(aEKNOW(f), k) = 1 then V(aEKNOW(g), k) = l.(»«).

The Proposition 5 states: the relation (••) represents a reasonable
rule of inference in the logic of entailed knowledge (LEK).

The rule
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of inference which is valid in the class £2(EX ) is referred to as
(RX).■

The distribution of knowledge (MT2) is a valid formula in £1(EX ).
When an explicit knowledge is considered then there is no need for any
plastic constraints.

The MT2 is not anymore a metatheorem; it assumes

the full power of being an axiom in the system of explicit knowledge.

Proposition 6: The formula

(MT2) aEKNOW(f & g) ->

aEKNOW(f) & aEKNOW(g)

is valid in the class of epistemic structures £2(EX ).

Proof:

Assume that V(aEKNOW(f & g), k) = 1 for every k e K .

Then there is a wff h so that INT(h)
is a subset of INT(f & g).

e

©(a, k), k

e

INT(h), and INT(h)

But INT(f & g) = INT(f) fl INT(g).

The

last assertion implies that INT(h) is a subset of INT(f) and INT(h) is
a subset of INT(g).

Hence V(aEKNOW(f), k) = 1 and

V(aEKNOW(g), k) = 1.-

The relation between entailed knowledge and ordinary knowledge is
interesting.

As one can expect the entailed knowledge implies

knowledge simpliciter.

The converse is not true in general.

two results elaborate on the relation between the two types of
knowledge.

Proposition 7:

The rule of inference

(RE) From f <-> g infer aEKNOW(f) <-> aEKNOW(g)

The next
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is valid in the class H(EX ) of epistemic structures.

Proof:

Assume that |= f <-> g for each k e K

If f <-> g then INT(f) = INT(g).

and each K e Q ( E x ).

Suppose there exist a wff h such

that INT(h) e 0(a, k) and k e INT(h).

The INT(h) is a subset of INT(f)

if and only if INT(h) is a subset of INT(g).

Hence,

V(aEKNOW(f), k) = 1 if and only if V(aEKNOW(g), k) = l.»

The consequences of the Proposition 7 is that (1) the rule of
inference (RX) implies the rule of inference (RE), and (2) the logic
of entailed knowledge is included in the logic of knowledge.
Naturally, one may ask when they are equivalent, i. e. , when is H(E) s
^( E x ).

Proposition 8:

The LEK and LK are equivalent, H(EX ) = H(E),

if

MT2 is valid in 11(E).

Proof: The proposition is true if (RX) is a reasonable rule of
inference in LK.

Assume that (MT2) is valid in 11(E).

To prove that

(RX) is valid only one of the importations is necessary.

Let the

plastic constraint (PC2)

if INT(f) fl INT(g) e ©(a, k) then INT(g) e ©(a, k)

hold in the class H(E).

Suppose |= f <-> g, |= f -> g, and

aKNOW(f) <-> a KNOW(g) are true for each k e K
(PC) if f -> g is true so is f <-> (f & g).

and each K e H ( E ) .

By

The application of (RE)

to f <-> (f & g) yields aKNOW(f) <-> aKNOW(f & g).

Using the (MT2) on

a KNOW(f & g) one obtains aKNOW(f & g) -> aKNOW(g) which finally gives
a KNOW(f) -> aKNOW(g).■
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Two theories are equivalent if and only if they have equivalent
axioms and rules of inference.

Therefore, LEK and LK are equivalent

theories about knowledge.

3.

Action Structures.

In a rational environment there is a

symbiotic relationship between actions and knowledge.

Actions should

be based on knowledge and knowledge should be enlarged by actions.
The later type of actions, i. e., 'knowledge extension actions, is the
single type of actions adraissable in the system.

An action is a sequence of one or more events, where events are
properties of time as continuum.

A distinction is to be made between

instant events which are mapped to moments of time and duration events
which are mapped to intervals of time.

There is also a metaphysical

difference between actions and events which reflects their causality.
Actions are internally caused changes in properties of time, while
events are externally caused changes in properties of time.

For us

both phenomena are identical and the common terra 'action' is used as a
reference.

The time continuum is not a consideration in the present study of
actions which means that actions are to be understood as discrete in
nature.

Thus, an action is change in a property of a complex.

is the property that is changed?

It is the knowledge set ©(a, k)

which is uniquely assigned to an agent at a complex k.
a knowledge set is an action.

What

Any change in

But the change in an arbitrary

knowledge set is a result from a move of an agent 'a' from one complex
to another complex.

So an alternative interpretation of an action is

a translation between complexes.
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According to the extent of knowledge and the nature of actions,
the class of all reasoning agents may be devided to three subclasses.
The- three subclasses are properly included in each other in the
following order a class of self-conscious agents, a class of agents
that has epistemic integrity, and a class of autonomous agents.

A

reasoning agent is said:

•to be self-conscious if it knows its name.
•to have an epistemic integrity if it is self-conscious and it
knows its axioms and rules of inference.
•to be autonomous if it has an epistemic integrity and all its
actions are internally caused or self-controlled.

The system of knowledge considers agents with epistemic integrity
only.

An action structure for a reasoning agent ’a' is a tuple

A 2 a = <@, T> where:
[1]

0 is a family of knowledge sets for an an agent 'a' and each

element of the family is indexed by the complex it is assigned to.
[2]

T is a translation relation defined on the family of

knowledge sets, a fortiori on the set of complexes K,
following properties:
(a)

T is reflexive
0(i) T 0(i)

(b)

T is antisymmetric
If 0(i) T ©(j) and 0(j) T 0(i) then 0(i) = 0(j)

(c)

T is euclidian
If ©(i) T ©(j) and ©(j) T 0(k) then 0(i) T 0(k)

and having the
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and i,j,k e K. and 0(i), 0(j), and 0(k) e 0.

An epistemic potential of an

agent is the cardinality of its knowledge set.

Three different types

of actions are superimposed by the action structures on a reasoning
agent.

The first type of actions are called affirmative or positive

actions.

The affirmative actions increase the epistemic potential of

a reasoning agent.

The second type of actions are the negative ones

which decrease the epistemic potential of a reasoning agent.

The last

ones are the neutral actions which do not change the epistemic
potential.

Positive actions are characteristic of monotonic reasoning or the
inter-complex conservative extension of knowledge.

Negative actions

are descriptive of non-monotonic reasoning and relevant to knowledge
revision.

At the present level the system does not allow

non-monotonic reasoning.

The enforcement of monotonicity is the

reason why the translation T has to be antisymmetric.

An alternative formulations of active and neutral actions could
be given in terms of the information content of a knowledge set.

•For any two complexes i, j e K a translation T from a complex i
to a complex j is called informative if and only if 0(i) is a proper
subset of 0(j).

The set difference between the knowledge sets 0(j) and

0(i) is termed as information gain and is denoted with IG(i|j).

•A translation T is called non-informative or if and only if for
any two complexes i, j e K,

the following identity 0(i) = 0(j) holds.

When there is a sequence of complexes i, j, k, ...

such that all

translations from one complex to another complex are non-informative,
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the epistemic potential of a reasoning agent is said to be in an
equilibrium.

The total number of action structures in a system of knowledge is
mn, where m = ||PA| | and n = ||K| |,
of an arbitrary set A.

and ||A| | denotes the cardinality

The analysis of the action structures could be

done in terms of latices (or equivalently posets) where the two basic
operations are set union and intersection and the relation of partial
order (translation) T is a set inclusion.

D.

OMNISCIENCE REVISITED

"The disadvantage of exclusive attention
to a group of abstractions,
however well founded, is that,
by nature of the case, you have
abstracted from the remainder of things."
Science and the Modern World, N. Whitehead

1.

Intensional Omniscience.

Ignoring the problem of omniscience

in reasoning about knowledge is considered to be a sinful act against
this consecrated issue in epistemology.

Thus, once again we face the

most vivid discourse in the logical analysis of epistemic and doxastic
notions, the question whether or not knowledge, consciousness,
awareness and belief are invariant with respect to logical
equivalence.

It is essential to realize, however, that the invariance

occurring in the analysis of propositional attitudes does not induce
the question of logical validity.

The problem with omniscience is the

admission of its intuitive plausibility and computational feasibility.

Is the issue of intuitive admissability of logical omniscience
reducible to ad hominem arguments?

The epistemological literature is
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flooded with stories that are used as a basis for rejecting the
deductive closure [35].

The arguments are always the same:

the

acceptance of omniscience produces highly idealized reasoning
environments.

In these environments, and the notorious and absurd

examples persist, a reasoning agent as a perfect knower must know the
answer to the problems of Goldbach conjecture, the last theorem of
Fermat, and whether or not P = NP.

A simple way to dismiss the arguments against omniscience is to
acknowledge that any formal system is based on abstraction, a fortiori
on some form of idealization of reality.

Most of the logical systems,

both classic and extended, are certainly not intended to be used by
'idiots' or 'savants', unless in the case of the later it is their
privileged area of excellence.

But even the most able and ingenious

minds working on a certain problem could easily fail to foresee all
the consequences of their results.

If one accepts that all logical inferences are purely analytical,
or as it was stated in PROLEGOMENA parthenogenetic, then any increase
in the information content of the reasoning space is entirely
psychological.

As a consequence, Hintikka claims that the omniscience

is not "only admissable but inevitable".

But as one could observe

from the extensive survey of methodologies dealing with the problem of
omniscience, Hintikka is not definite on the inevitability of
omniscience.

The question of satisfactory treatment from the

standpoint of semantics is still an open problem.
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It is important to delineate, at least partially, the problem of
logical omniscience with respect to reasoning by artifacts and
reasoning by humans.

When artifacts are involved in reasoning about

knowledge, the insistence on intuitive admissability is an outside
issue.

So one may designate a certain number of complexes according

to priorities which are context-dependent.

These complexes will

constitute a small KB where an unrestricted interchange on the basis
of logical equivalence may be allowed.

Thus, although in a syntactic

manner, the omniscience will be localized.

An interchange on the

global level among various knowledge bases could be unrestricted only
for propositions that are synonymous.

The last discourse has implicitly opened the Sisyphean problem of
relevance in reasoning about knowledge.

Relevance is a ubiquitous

research problem in its own right and I strongly suspect that a
solution in general terms is ever possible.

The problem is that

relevance and its intuitive interpretation are inherently
context-dependent notions.

In our case relevance is introduced for a denotational purpose.
It stands for that generic part (or a set of formulas) of the
knowledge base (KB) for which unrestricted interchange on the basis of
logical equivalence is permitted.

2.

Restricting The Omniscience.

The omniscience occurring in

the intensional context is due to the definition of intensional
confirmation and is reflected in the rule of inference RE.

How does

one proceed in in dealing with omniscience while attempting to
preserve the three fundamental principles of any formal system: the
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material and the logical adequateness, and the intuitive
admissability.

First of all one needs to indicate the omnipresent character of
the propositional attitude that that holds in all situations or times
with respect to certain complexes.

Secondly, one must determine the

set of complexes that are not subject the usual recursive truth
conditions.

The effect of leaving out the truth conditions for a

number of complexes is a division of the original system into two
subsystems, a strong and a weak subsystem.

The strong system has the

usual truth conditions and the logical and metalogical attributes
apply to it.

The weak system has only the rudimentary soundness

principles.

The methodology followed, to restrict the locally omniscient
system Sr in LK, is basically the one proposed by Hintikka [21],
Kripke [31], and Rantala [51].

In addition to the nonempty set of

possible and stable complexes K, a new set K' is introduced which is
possible empty and contains unstable complexes.
complexes are elements of the weak system.

The unstable

The Rule (RE) should be

restricted in such a way that is to apply only to some wffs in r(Le ).

Let T(Le ) be a set of all wffs in LK and let r(Lr ) be an
arbitrary recursive subset of T(Le ). Then the restricted system for
reasoning about knowledge Sr is axiomatized in the following way:

(PC) All propositional tautologies
(AT) aKNOW(f) -> f
(RE) If f, g and (f <-> g) e T(Lr) then infer
aKNOW(f) <-> aKNOW(g)
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The system Sr is different from the system Se in that the Rule
(RE) is restricted to the formulas that belong to Sr _

The restriction

imposed on the rule (RE) is syntactic certainly is not justified by
the intensional semantics.

Hence, any semantics for the restriction

is going to be context-dependent.

The restriction, in a way, is an

admission that either the propositional attitudes are not purely
intensional or the understanding and the definition of an intension
should be revised.

For the present, one has to be content with the

small doses of syntax in order to prevent, to an extent, the
occurrence of any form of omniscience.

The interpretation for the system Sr is a revised epistemic
structure Er = < K , K',

<I>, 0, V> where:

[1]

K is a nonempty set of complexes;

[2]

K' is a set of unstable complexes;

[3]

The function <l> provides each atomic proposition with its

intension:
O: n a -*P(KUK')
[4]

The function © assigns to a reasoning agent its knowledge

set:
0 : {a} x ( K U K j [5]

p (p (K(JK'))

V is a function of confirmation
V: T(Le ) x (K U K') -

2

such that:
(a)

V(p, k) = 1 if and only if p e n e and k e <t>(p)

(b)

For any wff f and any complex k, V(-'f, k) = 1 if and only

if V(f, k) = 0;
(c)

For any two wffs f and g and any complex k, V(f & g, k) = 1
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if and only if V(f, k) = 1 and V(g, k) = 1;
(d)

For any wff f and any complex k, V( aKNOW(f), k) = 1 if

and only if the INT(f) e 0(a, k) and ke INT(f), such that
©(a, k) = { |f |: aKNOW( f) ekj U 2 where E = {INT(g) : kelNT(g)}.
[6]

For every stable complex k and every unstable complex k' if

f, g e T(Lr ) and V(f <-> g, k) = 1 then V(f <-> g, k ’) = 1;

Proposition 9:

The system Sr is determined with respect to a

class of epistemic structures OCEj-).

Proof:

( i) (soundness)

From the definition of a restricted epistemic structure follows
that all of the axioms are valid.

Also the condition [6] imposed on

the Rule (RE) shows that it also preserves validity with respect to
any complex.

The system Sr is sound with respect to an interpretation

Er -

(ii) completeness

Each stable complex k is a maximal E r consistent set of formulas
The nature of unstable complexes is determined by the following
construction:

For each k e K

let k'= {f: aKNOW(f)ek}.

The unstable complexes, as one can observe, are not subject to
the usual truth-recursive conditions.

The confirmation function V for

the unstable complexes is defined so that for every k' e K'
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V(f, k') = 1 if and only if f e k' The condition for knowing says that
for any wff f and any complex k, V( aKNOW(f), k) = 1 if
and only if V(f, k) = 1 and V(f, k 1) = 1 iff that k 1 e INT(f).

As before, one has to prove that for every wff f complex k the
(**) V(f, k) = 1 if and only if f e k is true with respect to all
restricted epistemic structures £l(Er ).

Let f = aKNOW(g) and assume that (**) holds for f = g.

(only if)

V( aKNOW(g), k) = 1 then k* e Int(g) which implies that V(g, k 1) = 1
and so g e k 1.

By the construction of k* then aKNOW(g) e k. (if) If

aKNOW(g) e k then g e k*, and hence V(g, k ’) = 1.

Also, by (AT) g e

k. From the hypothesis V(g, k) = 1 so it follows that V(
aKNOW(g), k) = 1.

Suppose f, g, and f <-> g eT(Lr ). Then V(f <-> g, k) = 1 for
every k e K .

Applying Lemma 1 then f <-> g e k for every k e K .

By

the Rule (RE) if f <-> g is theorem of Sr so is aKNOW(f) <-> aKNOW(g)
a theorem of Sr .

The last assertion is true if aKNOW(f) e k if and

only if aKNOW(f) e k for every k e K .
if and only if f e k'.

By the construction of k* , f e k 1

Therefore, V(f <-> g, k') = 1 for every k' eK.

Assume the wff f is a valid formula such that Ej. |= f.
k) =1 for every k e K ,

and by (**) f ek.

Then V(f,

Since each complex k is a

maximal Sr consistent set of formulas, then by Lemma 1 each complex
contains every provable formula of Sr .«

The result, although, technical in nature is due to quite serious
semantic considerations.

The Proposition 9 shows that a knowledge

depth of a reasoning agent can be restricted within a formal system.
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A knowledge depth is the number of logically equivalent formulas.
When an agent knows one of them, it knows them all.

Applying the

restriction to a small but crucial set of formulas has certainly
useful computational properties.

Also, the number of inference steps

used in the process of reasoning can be limited for this KB.
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

A.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM

"It really is a nice theory.
The only defect I think it has
is probably common to all philosophical
theories.
It is wrong."
Naming and Necessity, S. Kripke
"That theory is worthless.
It is not even wrong."
W. Pauli

The present work provides only the necessary foundation for a
comprehensive intensional theory for reasoning about knowledge.
However, the advantages over the classic modal theory are noticeable.
The SK (or the System of Knowledge) is more general and flexible than
the theories based on classic modalities.

The flexibility is due to

the presence of plastic constraints which can capture practically any
mode of reasoning.

Also the problem of omniscience is differently

formulated in the intensional paradigm than in the modal paradigm.
Since, the Rule of Necessitation and the relation of accessibility are
not present the issue of resource-boundness is not as acute as with
the modal systems.

All these arguments make the propositional case

for intensional reasoning about knowledge a rather complete one.

An extensive consideration should be given to the further
development of the action structures.
is a marginal one.

At the present level their role

But in order to be autonomous the system of

knowledge must have full control over the actions.

This can be

achieved if an agent had access to various knowledge sets.

What is
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needed is an action relation similar to the one of accessibility but
without the possible side-effects of modal omniscience.

The intention was to formalize the fundamental notions of
knowledge in an intensional setting.
problems were left out.
knowledge.

Therefore, a number of technical

One of these technical issues is a common

In his landmark paper, Aumann showed that when two agents

have the identical priors and their posteriors is a common knowledge,
then these posteriors must be identical [3],

The idea of a common

knowledge and the notions of "everybody knows" and "all agents know"
are closely related.

Assume that there are two agents 'a' and 'b', and a proposition p
which is declared to be a common knowledge.

This is achieved if 'a'

knows p , and 'b ’ knows p , and 'a ' knows that 'b ' knows, and 'b ' knows
that 'a' knows, and 'a' knows that 'b' knows that 'a' knows, and so
on.

In the intensional environment it is fairly straightforward to
formalize a common knowledge.

Let f be a wff that represents a fact

which is declared to be known to every reasoning agent in the system.
The formula f is a common knowledge if and only if for all k e K

and

all a^ e PK the intension of f , INT(f) e ©(a, k). Therefore, V(f, k) =
1 if and only if V(aKNOW(f)& .. .fi^KNOWCf), k) = 1 for all k e K .

Let

CM(f) denote that the wff f is a common knowledge and augment the
epistemic language Le with a monadic epistemic operator 'AKNOW' (read
'all know' or 'everybody knows').
V(AKNOWn (f) , k) = 1 for all ke K.

Then V(CM(f), k) = 1 if and only if
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However, if a complex is the only primitive notion in the system
then the problem of propositional identity and equivalence remains
unsolved.

A possible avenue for resolving the omniscience is based on

some archaic ideas in epistemology [15, 25, 44] where a new primitive
such as a context is introduced in the semantics of the system.

Then

a meaning of a wff f is a function from the set of ordered pairs [<i,
a>, <j , b>, <k, c>, ...] to the set 2 and is denoted by MEAN(f).

The

first element of each order pair is drawn from the set of possible
complexes K, while the second element from the set of possible
contexts Y.

Now, the identity between two propositions, p and q, can

be defined as an identity between the respective meanings of the
propositions, i. e., MEAN(p)s MEAN(q).

The notion of meaning of an

expression allows an unrestricted interchange on the basis of identity
at every complex and in every context.

Similarily, the issue of non-monotonic reasoning can be addressed
by introducing time as a primitive notion.

Now, the extended meaning

of a wff f can be defined as a set of ordered triples [<i, a, t>, <j ,
b, u>, ...}.

The idea is to have monotonic reasoning on a micro-level

within small time intervals.

The effect of non-monotonic reasoning

will be on a macro level, where a knowledge set of a reasoning agent
does not necessarily have conservative extensions.

The use of context

and time represent interesting possibilities for an extension of the
propositional system for reasoning about knowledge.
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B.

QUANTIFICATION THEORY

"The future enter into us,
in order to transform itself in us,
long before it happens."
Letters to a Young Poet, R.M. Rilke

Suppose that the epistemic language Le is augmented with
individual variables, predicate variables, as well as with individual
and predicate constants.

The language Le also admits improper symbols

such as 3 (read 'exists'), V (read 'for all'), V (read 'for some'),
and A (read 'for most’).

The operator of necessity L is to be read as

'it is understandably so'.

Another descriptive symbol which can also

be classified as an improper symbol denoted by 'U' and stands for
'there is a unique ... such that'[44].

Knowledge is again modelled as an empirical relation between an
agent and a proposition.

This empirical relation is represented by a

two-place predicate constant which admits individual constants ranging
over the set PA and zero-place predicate variables which stand for the
propositions.

The standard set of quantifiers is augmented to

accommodate, as it has been proposed by Zadeh [58], reasoning about a
common sense.

Assume u is the proposition "There exist an object x which is
blue and Jim knows that Ann knows that Tom knows".

There are four

separate propositions p, q, r, and s nested in the proposition u.
These are:

(s)

There is an object x which is blue.

(r)

Tom knows the proposition s.

(q)

Ann knows the proposition r.
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(p)

Jim knows the proposition q.

The propositions p, q, r, and s appear in an indirect context.

Let

p", q", r", and s" denote the concepts expressed by the propositions
p, q, r, and s respectively.

For instance p" stands for the

expression UPL (P <-> f) which is read as 'there is a unique
zero-place predicate variable P such that the zero-place predicate
variable P is understandably equal to the formula f'[44].

The whole

expression stands for the proposition p expressed by the formula f.
Let BLUE(x) be a one-place predicate constant, and the names of the
agents Jim, Ann and Tom are abbreviated to the first character
respectively.

Then the proposition u in an epistemic context has the

form:

Vx((3x) & jKNOW(a"KNOW("tKNOW("BLUE(X)))))

The introduction of the quantification and the predicate
variables reveals the true higher-order nature of intensional logic.
A sufficient extension for modeling epistemic and doxastic
inclinations is a second-order system.

In general any theory,

first-order, second order up to the transfinite ordinals can be
regarded as an instance of the type theory.

Higher-order theories

have commonly stronger semantics than any first-order theory.

The

distinction between different types of objects which is the basis of
type theory is already found in most of the mathematical and logical
reasoning.

All this, nevertheless, has not contributed yet to the

acceptance of type theory in Artificial Intelligence [1j.
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A strong argument against the higher-order theories is that these
theories are not complete.

Secondly, from a technical point of view

such as resolution and unification, the higher-order theories are more
complicated.

However, today there is a number of generalized

completeness theorems for higher-order systems.

Also for the last ten

years many researchers have done excellent work on the unification
problem for higher-order theories.

In essence, some of the technical difficulties encountered in
type theory are a small price to pay for the power and naturalness of
the expression that can be found in the higher order theories.
Therefore, the present propositional system for intensional reasoning
about knowledge has two reasonable extensions, quantification theory
and resolution-based procedures for logical systems that involve
epistemic operators.

And the difficult task of developing a full and

a comprehensive theory of reasoning about knowledge promises no lack
of interesting arguments.
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